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Abstract
This paper presents incremental verification-validation, a novel
approach for checking rich data structure invariants expressed as
separation logic assertions. Incremental verification-validation com-
bines static verification of separation properties with efficient, short-
circuiting dynamic validation of arbitrarily rich data constraints.
A data structure invariant checker is an inductive predicate in sep-
aration logic with an executable interpretation; a short-circuiting
checker is an invariant checker that stops checking whenever it
detects at run time that an assertion for some sub-structure has
been fully proven statically. At a high level, our approach does two
things: it statically proves the separation properties of data structure
invariants using a static shape analysis in a standard way but then
leverages this proof in a novel manner to synthesize short-circuiting
dynamic validation of the data properties. As a consequence, we
enable dynamic validation to make up for imprecision in sound
static analysis while simultaneously leveraging the static verifica-
tion to make the remaining dynamic validation efficient. We show
empirically that short-circuiting can yield asymptotic improvements
in dynamic validation, with low overhead over no validation, even
in cases where static verification is incomplete.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Verification; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings
of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Pro-
grams
Keywords short-circuiting validation; incremental verification-
validation; subtraction-directed synthesis; data structure invariants;
separation logic; shape analysis
1. Introduction
We consider the problem of efficient and safe dynamic validation
of deep, program-specific data structure invariants. Such invariants
combine pointer-shape properties (e.g., “l is an acyclic, singly-
linked list”) with data-value properties (e.g., “the integer data
elements of l are sorted in non-decreasing order”). Combined
shape-data properties are both difficult for the programmer to
maintain and challenging for fully-automatic static analysis to
verify. While modern shape analyzers can reason effectively about
pointer-shape properties—especially for structures with limited
sharing, such as lists and trees—shape-data analyzers are limited by
their dependency on and interaction with base data-value abstract
domains or solvers [6, 7, 16, 17].
Static verification has always held the promise to improve
software by definitively ruling out entire classes of bugs before
execution. But this promise holds for a particular program of interest
only if the developer is able to obtain a full verification for it.
Dynamic validation compensates for the shortcomings of static
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 0  5  10  15  20
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
(s
ec
)
size of binary search tree (million nodes)
dynV
iVV
noV
Figure 1. Frequent, dynamic validation does not scale. This plot
shows execution times for a binary search tree workload that
performs a million random deletions, each followed by inserting
the deleted value again over increasingly-sized trees. The dynV line
applies dynamic validation after each delete-insert pair; noV has no
validation; and iVV validates after each pair using short-circuiting—
this paper. The smallest size in all configurations is 100 nodes. The
size on the dynV line goes up by 100 at each step.
verification by trapping unsafe operations at run time (e.g., by halting
execution or raising an exception). Several systems [4, 11, 23]
have made run-time checks easier to apply; however, run-time
enforcement of data structure invariants, in particular, have remained
problematic for two main reasons:
Checking Overhead. The overhead of run-time checking can
be significant because a data structure invariant is a universal
property over a set of objects—and thus checking the invariant
is usually linear-time in the size of the structure. Since adding
dynamic validation can change the asymptotic complexity of data
structure operations, validation can cause dramatic slowdowns.
Figure 1 shows such slowdowns for a workload of binary search
tree operations on increasing data structure sizes. The dynamic
validation variant (dynV) can only reach a binary search tree with
300 nodes in 15 seconds, while the no validation variant (noV)
can reach 20,000,000 nodes in 5 seconds. Because of the linear-
time complexity of validation, the dynV variant is O(n), while
the noV variant is O(lgn) where n is the size of the tree. Thus,
frequent checking of data structure invariants can be infeasible even
in debugging scenarios.
Additional Risk of Memory Faults. Run-time checking may
introduce new, unexpected pointer bugs. Traversing pointers in a
malformed data structure could lead to unanticipated bad deref-
erences (e.g., on null or freed pointers) or even non-termination
(e.g., on unexpected cyclic structures). Thus, such checking may
introduce unacceptable risk in deployment scenarios.
In this paper, we address these concerns by applying static shape
analysis to(1) synthesize short-circuiting dynamic data structure
1
ar
X
iv
:1
51
1.
04
84
6v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  1
6 N
ov
 20
15
validation to reduce run-time checking overhead and (2) statically
prove separation properties to eliminate the risk of memory faults.
Contributions. This paper is a response to the inevitable impreci-
sion of static shape-data analysis. While a static analysis can always
be made precise enough to verify any given set of benchmarks (with
an appropriate amount of research, development, and specification
effort), no analysis can ever be precise enough for an ever grow-
ing set. Our approach is a step towards providing the benefit of
incremental verification-validation even in the face of imprecise in-
variant inference or insufficient specification. To clearly distinguish
when some part of a data structure invariant is checked, we reserve
verification for static checking and validation for dynamic checking.
In Section 2, we discuss the notion of short-circuiting invariant
checkers: validation code that leverages a hypothetical fact to short-
circuit dynamic validation of a data structure invariant. Short-circuit
validation is the result of a simple but key observation: when asked to
prove P(x), we can decompose this proof into proving, for example,
P(y) for some y and separately that x = y. This observation enables
us to connect facts that we verify statically (e.g., P(y)) and facts
that we need to validate dynamically (e.g., x = y). In particular,
we get the benefit of short-circuiting validation when we carefully
choose the facts to validate dynamically to be fast and cheap to
check yet helpful in making the static verification more feasible. A
significant challenge in this work is that P is inductive and effective
short-circuiting can only be obtained when static verification and
dynamic validation are interleaved in the recursion.
To do so, we make the following technical contributions:
• We describe a static shape-data analysis needed to synthesize
short-circuiting validation (Section 3) driven by the aforemen-
tioned proof decomposition. In particular, we introduce the vali-
dated view abstract domain, which augments the static analysis
with the ability to track arbitrarily complex, uninterpreted data-
value facts (e.g., to statically prove P(y)). Then, we describe
a code instrumentation that reifies, as programs variables, the
existential logic variables in the statically-inferred shape-data
invariants. Conceptually, this logic-variable reification provides
hooks at run time to the proof constructed by the static shape-
data analysis (e.g., to dynamically validate x = y).
• We introduce a subtraction-directed synthesis approach to gen-
erate both short-circuiting checkers and the calls to them, using
invariants inferred by the static shape-data analysis and reified
logic variables (Section 4). The result is incrementalized dy-
namic validation of inductive data structure invariants with no
run-time memoization.
• We empirically evaluate our approach by applying a prototype
tool (called DIVVA) to verification and validation of operations
with complex shape-data invariants (Section 5). We see evidence
of asymptotic improvements in dynamic validation cost—for
example, the iVV line in Figure 1. The improvements hold even
for invariants with data properties beyond the reach of most
static verifiers (e.g., involving hashing and bit masking).
Our mixed static-dynamic technique differs from prior fully
dynamic, run-time approaches to reducing checking overhead.
Ditto [27] incrementalizes data structure validation checks by mem-
oizing validation calls and then only executing subsequent checks
for the objects for which the memoized checks have been invalidated
(e.g., by writes). This fully dynamic approach essentially trades
off the execution overhead of validation checks for the memory
overhead of maintaining a memo table in a shadow heap. In contrast,
our approach leverages a static proof of separation properties to
synthesize incremental dynamic data structure validation without
the memory overhead of memoization or the execution overhead of
write barriers.
2. Goal: Short-Circuiting Validation
In this section, we consider a simple but illustrative example of a data
structure operation with an assertion of its invariant. We illustrate
that this assertion can be incrementally verified and validated in a
sound manner.
We consider binary search trees here, as the data structure re-
quires a well-known intertwined shape-data invariant. Our technique
also applies to (and is even more important for) more complex data
invariants. In Section 5, we evaluate our implementation on a hash
trie, which is a tree-structured hash map that uses bit-blocks from
hash keys to form a trie [3]. This structure employs bit-masking,
hash codes, and rehashing on collision. Even for state-of-the-art
static verifiers, such as Thor [16], this data structure invariant is chal-
lenging and likely out of reach for current techniques [15]. Another
important feature of our approach is the ability to obtain incremental
dynamic validation even when the pre-condition specification is in-
sufficient (not strong enough) to statically prove the post-condition,
which we demonstrate here with the setroot example in Figure 2.
We consider a C type declaration for a binary tree bt:
typedef struct node { val v; struct node* l; struct node* r;}* bt;
Each node contains three fields: v, which stores a data value, and
fields l and r that contain pointers to left and right sub-trees. We
leave unspecified the type of data values (val). In Figure 2a, we
give an inductive definition for a binary search tree in a standard
separation logic notation. As a convention, we use hatted letters
like t̂ for symbolic logic variables used in static analysis and
write inductive definitions like bst with a distinguished recursion
parameter as in t̂ ·bst(. . .). A binary search tree is a binary tree where
the data values obtained from the in-order traversal are ordered—and
thus the search tree invariant specification bst includes the allowable
range for the data values in that sub-tree. The t̂ · bst(m̂in, m̂ax)
predicate states that t̂ points to a binary search tree with allowable
range [m̂in, m̂ax); we emphasize with shading the parts of the bst
definition capturing the search data property. As is well-understood,
using separating conjunction N between the root node pointed to by
t̂ and the sub-trees pointed to by l̂ and r̂ specifies that t̂ is structurally
a tree (i.e., does not have sharing or cycles); in other words, the
non-shaded parts of the definition correspond the binary tree shape
property.
In Figure 2b, we rewrite the inductive definition bst in a short-
hand that suggests an executable interpretation. Disjunctions are
expressed as if-then-else conditionals and existential variables cor-
respond only to values obtained from dereferencing the recursion
parameter t̂. Note that this definition is simply a shorthand and has
the same meaning as the definition in Figure 2a expressed in a more
standard notation.
Now consider the setroot procedure shown in Figure 2c. The
programmer states the assumption (i.e., pre-condition) that t on
entry points to a binary search tree satisfying t ·bst(−∞,∞) (line 1)
and is non-null (line 2). We write −∞ and ∞ for the compile-time
constants corresponding to the minimum and maximum values in
the val type (e.g., INT_MIN and INT_MAX), respectively. In this
procedure, she then sets the data value at the root node to the passed-
in parameter v (line 3) and then wants to assert that the modified
tree is still a binary search tree with the assert at line 4. First, note
that the assert at line 4 is not provable statically because the search
property may be violated after the assignment on line 3, as there
are no constraints on the value of v. Thus, it would be unsound
for any static verifier to eliminate this assert. Second, observe that
a dynamic validation of t · bst(−∞,∞) is a linear-time operation
in the number of nodes of the binary tree t and furthermore has
the non-trivial obligation to dynamically validate the separation
constraints—even though the binary tree shape is unchanged and
the only data value that was modified was at the root node.
2
t̂ ·bst( m̂in, m̂ax ) def= emp ∧ t̂ = null ∨ ∃v̂, l̂, r̂.
t̂ ·v 7 v̂ N t̂ ·l 7 l̂ N t̂ ·r 7 r̂ N l̂ ·bst( m̂in, v̂ ) N r̂ ·bst( v̂, m̂ax )
∧ t̂ 6= null ∧ m̂in≤ v̂ ∧ v̂ < m̂ax
(a) An inductive definition bst for binary search trees in separation
logic.
t̂ ·bst( m̂in, m̂ax ) def= if t̂ = null then emp else
t̂->l·bst( m̂in, t̂->v ) N t̂->r·bst( t̂->v, m̂ax )
∧ m̂in≤ t̂->v ∧ t̂->v< m̂ax
(b) The inductive definition bst from (a) written in a shorthand for
checkers. A dereference expression â-> f corresponds to the value of an
implicitly separated points-to predicate (e.g., the referencing expression
t̂->v corresponds to v̂ in the points-to predicate t̂ ·v 7 v̂ from (a)).

 

void setroot(bt t, val v) {
1 assume(t ·bst(−∞,∞));
2 assume(t 6= null);
3 t->v = v;
4 assert(t ·bst(−∞,∞));
5
6
}
(c) With full verification.


 

void setroot(bt t, val v) {
assume(t ·bst(−∞,∞));
assume(t 6= null);
val oldv = t->v; t->v = v;
assert(−∞ <= t->v && t->v < ∞ &&
bstsc(t->l,−∞, t->v,−∞, oldv)
&& bstsc(t->r, t->v,∞, oldv,∞));
}
(d) With short-circuiting validation.
bool bstsc(bt n, val min, val max, val hmin, val hmax) {
1 assume( n ·bst(hmin,hmax) );
2 if (min == hmin && max == hmax) return true;
3 return n == NULL ? true : min <= n->v && n->v < max &&
4 bstsc(n->l, min, n->v, hmin, n->v )
5 && bstsc(n->r, n->v, max, n->v, hmax );
}
(e) Compilation of the short-circuiting invariant checker bstsc from
Figure 3c to C code (once separation has been proven statically).
9
oldv= 8
t
2
(−∞,9, −∞,8 )
(−∞,2, −∞,2 )
4
(2,9, 2,8 )
(2,4, 2,4 )
6
(4,9, 4,8 )
(4,6, 4,6 )
...
l
10
(9,∞, 8,∞ )
...
(10,∞, 10,∞ )
r
(f) Illustrating short-circuiting validation, executing lines 4–6 of (d), on
a binary search tree where the data value at the root node was changed
from 8 to 9 by setroot. The four-tuple labels correspond to the last four
arguments of calls to bstsc.
Figure 2. Validating the binary search tree invariant in setroot
after the data value of the root node is set to v.
Incremental Verification-Validation. Even if full static verifica-
tion of a data structure check is not possible (as with the assert on
line 4 in the setroot procedure), surprisingly we can still use the
incomplete static reasoning to incrementalize the check. Specifi-
cally, our incremental verification-validation approach on an assert
consists of two phases. First, it tries to statically verify the assertion
using invariants derived by a static shape analysis. If it is successful,
no dynamic validation is needed and the assert can be fully elimi-
nated. If it is partially successful in that the separation properties are
statically proven, then it proceeds to synthesize a short-circuiting,
incremental assertion to replace the original, full-structure assertion.
This short-circuiting, incremental assertion is easy to express in C
code because it does not need to check separation properties that
were verified statically. If the static verifier is not able to prove
separation, our tool simply raises an alarm and does not proceed to
synthesis.
Returning to the assert at line 4 in the setroot procedure, we
can reason about the binary search tree invariant to see that a change
to the data value at the root node could only possibly invalidate the
invariant along the right spine of the left sub-tree t->l or the left
spine of the right sub-tree t->r (i.e., these are the only nodes whose
allowable range [m̂in, m̂ax) could have changed). An incremental
validation—one that takes advantage of the knowledge that t was a
binary search tree before the update—needs to traverse at most these
two paths and thus can re-validate the invariant while traversing
only a logarithmic number of nodes. We diagram these two paths in
Figure 2f with squares for the traversed nodes and with triangles for
the skipped sub-trees (ignore the caption and the number labels for
the moment). As we will see, lines 4–6 of Figure 2d indeed traverse
at most the two paths discussed above by replacing the assertion
to the bst predicate with calls to the synthesized short-circuiting
invariant checker bstsc shown in Figure 2e. The rest of this section
will focus on describing how one would define bstsc to obtain this
short-circuiting validation.
As alluded in Section 1, the basic idea behind a short-circuiting
checker like bstsc is to make explicit a hypothesis of which it can
take advantage. This idea can expressed in the following correctness
condition for bstsc that we call its safe replacement criterion:
Criterion (Safe Replacement with a Short-Circuiting Invariant
Checker). For bstsc, it is the case that
if n̂ ·bst(ĥmin, ĥmax)
then n̂ ·bstsc(m̂in, m̂ax, ĥmin, ĥmax)⇒ n̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax)
For clarity, we first consider deriving the short-circuiting checker
bstsc in separation logic and then subsequently consider the compila-
tion to C code. Observe that the short-circuiting checker bstsc takes
two additional parameters ĥmin and ĥmax (standing for hypothesis
min and max, respectively) compared to the original checker bst.
The validation hypothesis is explicitly n̂ ·bst(ĥmin, ĥmax). This val-
idation hypothesis may be used to return early (i.e., short-circuit
checking) when validating the desired property n̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax). In
other words, a short-circuiting checker does not need to validate the
desired property directly but can do so under the assumption that
the validation hypothesis holds.
A trivial implementation of bstsc that satisfies the safe replace-
ment criterion is to ignore the validation hypothesis and be defined
as n̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax)—of course this offers no benefit over bst itself.
A slightly smarter variant, bstsc a in Figure 3a, explicitly assumes
the validation hypothesis on line 1 and then checks a short-circuiting
condition on line 5 (shown shaded): if the goal is exactly the hypoth-
esis, then it can soundly short circuit and return true early without
further checking. This short circuiting is, however, shallow—if the
short-circuiting condition is not satisfied, the entire tree rooted at n
is traversed by bst.
To arrive at a deep short-circuiting, let us consider bstsc b in
Figure 3b, which is semantically equivalent to bstsc a. In bstsc b,
we have inlined the calls to bst. In other words, logically, we have
unfolded the inductive predicate given by bst in both the hypothesis
and the goal. By unfolding the hypothesis, we see that in the case
that n̂ 6= null, we also have that n̂->l ·bst(ĥmin, n̂->v) and n̂->r ·
bst(n̂->v, ĥmax). We use these hypotheses (shown shaded) to derive
the deep short-circuiting checker bstsc by rewriting the recursive bst
checks on lines 7–8 on the left and right sub-trees with recursive calls
to the short-circuiting checker. The validation hypotheses of these
recursive checks, n̂->l · bstsc(m̂in, n̂->v, ĥmin, n̂->v) and n̂->r ·
bstsc(n̂->v, m̂ax, n̂->v, ĥmax), are satisfied by the hypotheses about
3

 

n̂ ·bstsc a(m̂in, m̂ax, ĥmin, ĥmax) def=
1 n̂ ·bst(ĥmin, ĥmax)⇒
2
3
4
5 if m̂in = ĥmin ∧ m̂ax = ĥmax then true
6 else n̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax)
7
8
9
(a) Shallow short-circuiting.


 

n̂ ·bstsc b(m̂in, m̂ax, ĥmin, ĥmax) def=
(if n̂ = null then emp
else n̂->l ·bst(ĥmin, n̂->v)
N n̂->r ·bst(n̂->v, ĥmax)
∧ ĥmin≤ n̂->v∧ n̂->v< ĥmax) ⇒
if m̂in= ĥmin ∧ m̂ax= ĥmax then true
else if n̂ = null then emp
else n̂->l ·bst(m̂in, n̂->v)
N n̂->r ·bst(n̂->v, m̂ax)
∧ m̂in≤ n̂->v∧ n̂->v< m̂ax
(b) Unfolding the hypothesis and the goal.


 

n̂ ·bstsc(m̂in, m̂ax, ĥmin, ĥmax) def=
(if n̂ = null then emp
else n̂->l ·bst(ĥmin, n̂->v)
N n̂->r ·bst(n̂->v, ĥmax)
∧ ĥmin≤ n̂->v∧ n̂->v< ĥmax) ⇒
if m̂in= ĥmin ∧ m̂ax= ĥmax then true
else if n̂ = null then emp
else n̂->l ·bstsc(m̂in, n̂->v, ĥmin, n̂->v )
N n̂->r ·bstsc(n̂->v, m̂ax, n̂->v, ĥmax )
∧ m̂in≤ n̂->v∧ n̂->v< m̂ax
(c) Deep short-circuiting.
Figure 3. The short-circuiting invariant checker bstsc. It is synthesized by the following a proof of inclusion in separation logic.
n̂->l and n̂->r, respectively. This deep short-circuiting checker
bstsc allows many more opportunities to apply a short-circuiting
hypothesis and return early (because the short-circuiting is checked
on each recursive call), thus avoiding a full traversal of the tree.
Intuitively, the previous paragraph describes synthesizing the
deep short-circuiting checker bstsc by following the proof of the
safe replacement criterion:
n̂ ·bst(ĥmin, ĥmax)⇒(
n̂ ·bstsc(m̂in, m̂ax, ĥmin, ĥmax)⇒ n̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax))
and abducting a definition for bstsc. In Section 4, we see that bstsc
is synthesized by attempting to prove
n̂ ·bst(ĥmin, ĥmax)⇒ n̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax) (†)
while permitting abduction of pure, data constraints. We call this
process subtraction-directed synthesis because the proof strategy
follows the standard approach of unfolding and subtraction to prove
separation. When bstsc is successfully synthesized, we have that
the spatial part of the above implication (†) holds. Thus, it is
straightforward to compile the bstsc definition from Figure 3c to
C code using the &&-conjunction operator as shown in Figure 2e
because we have guaranteed that the separation properties hold
statically (and thus do not need them to be validated dynamically).
Short-Circuiting Validation of setroot. We now return to our
claim that the check on lines 4–6 in the short-circuiting validation
version of setroot shown in Figure 2d traverses at most two paths
in tree t. This is illustrated in Figure 2f, which considers an example
where a call to setroot changes the data value at the root node from
the value 8 to the value 9. The four-tuple labels on each node indicate
the (min,max,hmin,hmax) arguments passed to bstsc at that node
from the initiating calls on lines 5 and 6. This short-circuiting version
skips sub-trees that are not on the aforementioned two paths because
their roots satisfy the short-circuiting guard condition (i.e., that
min == hmin && max == hmax).
Automatic synthesis of short-circuiting checkers like bstsc is
vastly preferable, for the developer, to manual checker transforma-
tions. While it is perhaps possible for a clever developer to rewrite
the validation routines themselves by hand to be short-circuiting,
rewriting asserts to make appropriate calls to these routines is chal-
lenging and error-prone because of the need to modify code to
expose particular data values. An automated technique is needed to
statically prove the validation hypothesis of the short-circuiting in-
variant checker (including the separation properties) and determine
the appropriate arguments to it. The goal of this paper is to automate
this process of incrementalization—eliminating the tediousness and
guaranteeing the safety of the transformation.
Soundness: Assumptions and Guarantees. The expected input
for our approach is a program with asserts of data structure invari-
ants expressed in separation logic like bst. If modular verification-
validation is desired, pre-conditions can be expressed additionally
with assumes. Like with any modular verification technique, we
assume that user-specified assumes are sound pre-conditions (which
could be guaranteed at each call site with corresponding asserts).
The verification-validation problem that we address is to try to prove
all asserts. If successful, the output of our technique is a static veri-
fication of the separation properties (e.g., a proof that t is a binary
tree) and a rewriting of the asserts to use short-circuiting dynamic
validation (e.g., an incremental run-time check that the binary tree
t has the search property). If unsuccessful, the output is an alarm
for each assert where it was unable to statically verify the separa-
tion properties. That is, like any other static verifier for separation
logic, it soundly rejects programs where it cannot prove the sepa-
ration properties. As an alternative to rejecting such programs, one
could consider dynamically validating such unproven separation
properties using, for example, global heap coloring techniques [20].
Challenges: Synthesizing Short-Circuiting Validation. As we
have seen, short-circuiting validation checkers can potentially reduce
the asymptotic complexity of validation while providing the same
benefits as whole-structure checkers. Automatic generation of short-
circuiting checkers requires addressing two key challenges:
(Challenge 1) Synthesis to transform whole-structure assertions
(like bst) into calls to short-circuiting checkers (like bstsc). This
process must generate both the additional hypothesis arguments for
such calls and add the necessary scalar assertions. For example, the
assert on lines 4–6 in Figure 2d correspond to unfolding the original
assertion t ·bst(−∞,∞) once to account for the change at the root
node.
(Challenge 2) Synthesis of deep short-circuiting invariant
checkers (like bstsc) for general inductive data structure invariants
(like bst).
(Challenge 3) A technical challenge that arises to support the
above is determining how to connect statically verified invariants
with dynamic validation. For example, the new variable oldv must
be instrumented into the program on line 3 so that it can be used in
the assert on lines 4–6 in Figure 2d.
The rest of this paper describes how we address these challenges
with a synthesis approach based on inductive shape-data analysis.
Overview. Our approach consists of three processes that we show
schematically in Figure 4:
1. Static shape-data analysis infers loop invariants in separa-
tion logic. It determines when previously established data-value
facts have been preserved—and can thus be relied upon, at run time,
during validation. A validated view is a constraint we introduce
to track arbitrary data constraints in materialized memory regions
(Section 3.1).
4
Shape-data
analysis
Logic-variable
reification
Short-circuiting
synthesis Execution
short-circuiting
condition
if (n==n̂ &&· · ·) returnbstsc(t,n,m,n̂,m̂)
programmatic
valuation
âp = φ(ât, â1)
validated view
âp ·bst(. . .) N= (̂l ·bst(. . .) N r̂ ·bst(. . .))︷ ︸︸ ︷
âp ·l 7 l̂ N · · · N · · ·t ·bst(n,m)
unproven
separation
alarm
data
assertion
failure
Figure 4. An overview of our approach to obtain short-circuiting data structure validation. The first three phases (blue boxes) are compile-time
phases to synthesize code that runs in a normal execution environment (red box).
2. Logic-variable reification transforms the program to explic-
itly connect logic variables in the static analysis invariants to con-
crete values at run time by constructing a programmatic valuation
(Section 3.2). This code instrumentation enables run-time assertion
checking to rely upon invariants discovered during static analysis.
3. Subtraction-directed synthesis of short-circuiting valida-
tion automatically transforms expensive whole-data-structure vali-
dation asserts into cheaper, short-circuiting asserts that can soundly
skip portions of the data structure at run time (Section 4). To syn-
thesize the code for short-circuiting checkers, we fix a template
(i.e., a sketch [29]) similar to the shallow short-circuiting checker
bstsc a in Figure 3a and then reuse our synthesizer on the template
code to fill it in with deep short-circuiting, as in bstsc (Figure 3c).
Short-circuiting synthesis can raise an alarm if the spatial part of
the safe replacement criterion cannot be proven statically to soundly
synthesize short-circuiting checkers like bstsc.
4. Assertion execution with the rewritten asserts in a normal
execution environment realizes incremental invariant validation
whenever the short-circuiting condition is triggered. If a data prop-
erty is violated on execution, an assertion failure is raised.
3. Reifying Static Analysis Invariants
The static shape-data analysis needed to synthesize short-circuiting
validation code from statically-inferred shape-data invariants must
address two problems. First, it must have the ability to prove existen-
tial weakenings of shape-data invariants even when it cannot prove
the original (e.g., prove ∃û. â · k(û) when â · k(v̂) cannot be proved).
While this is challenging in general, we identify a particularly im-
portant scenario for short-circuiting validation: tracking arbitrarily
complicated data-value constraints in unmodified portions of the
data structure. This precise tracking of unmodified portions can be
seen as a static analogue of memoization in incremental compu-
tation. We realize this precise tracking of unmodified portions by
augmenting a shape-data analysis with what we call a validated view
abstraction (Section 3.1).
Second, it must provide access at run time to concrete val-
ues corresponding to existentially-quantified symbolic variables in
statically-proven invariants. We provide this access by reading off,
from the proof, a program expression derived from the pre-condition
to witness each symbolic variable (Section 3.2).
In this section, we extend our running example to both illustrate
the challenges introduced in Section 2 and provide intuitions for how
our analysis and synthesis techniques address them. We will focus
on an example-driven discussion here, and we separately formalize
the algorithms for validated views and logic-variable reification in
in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.
3.1 Validated Views
To describe how our validated view abstraction enriches a shape-data
abstraction, we first discuss an example shape-data abstraction.
Preliminaries: Inductive Shape-Data Analysis. Inductive shape
analysis [7, 10] uses inductive predicates like bst to statically
summarize unbounded memory regions. A memory region that
satisfies bst includes the pointer-shape property (i.e., is a binary
tree) but also the data-value property (i.e., that it satisfies the search
invariant). Thus, such a summarized bst memory region is statically
known to satisfy the binary search tree invariant. On the left side of
Figure 5a, we express a shape-data invariant as a separating shape
graph. This invariant says a root t̂ satisfies bst with minimum value
m̂in and maximum value m̂ax. Here the nodes represent pointers
(i.e., memory addresses), and the edges represent abstract memory
regions. The thick arrow can be read as a static fact indicating
that the memory region rooted at t̂ satisfies the inductive predicate
t̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax).
In inductive shape analysis, the key operations are (1) materializ-
ing abstractions of single memory cells from summarized regions
by unfolding inductive predicates (left-to-right in Figure 5a) and (2)
summarizing memory regions by folding into inductive predicates,
using any number of unary abstraction or binary widening operators
(right-to-left). Consider statically analyzing an iteration traversing
into the middle of a binary search tree with a cursor pointer p: in
Figure 5b, we show a precisely inferred loop invariant that is crucial
to be able to synthesize short-circuiting validation. Here, we indicate
that the program variable p contains the address âp by annotating
the program variable below the node representing âp. We adopt the
naming convention that âx is the symbolic address of the binary
search tree node pointed-to by program variable x, and v̂x is the
symbolic data value of that node (i.e., x->v). The memory region
between addresses t̂ and âp is described by a bst segment [7], a form
of separating implication, corresponding to a validation tree with a
hole [18] at âp. The thick arrow between nodes t̂ and âp is read as
knowing statically that the memory region from t̂ satisfies the valida-
tion check t̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax) up to checking âp ·bst(ûmin, ûmax). The
pair of symbolic values ûmin and ûmax correspond to the lower and
upper bounds needed for a binary search tree rooted at âp in order for
the tree rooted at t̂ to satisfy the validation check t̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax).
This bst segment summarizes the path that pointer p has already
traversed and is derived by folding cells materialized on the pre-
vious iteration. Shape analysis tools vary in how they represent
segments—but some mechanism to do so is fundamental.
The key observation to make in the rules shown in Figure 5a
is that folding (i.e., going right-to-left) requires verifying a pure,
non-memory, data constraint (shaded) just to summarize a memory
region into a summary predicate like bst or bst-segment. In the
idealized loop invariant shown in Figure 5b, the total ordering
constraints on symbolic data values (shaded) must be tracked
by the base data-value domain in order to derive that the whole
memory region from t̂ still satisfies t̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax). The two middle
constraints û′min ≤ v̂p < û′max are not difficult to derive (come from
unfolding at the current binary search tree node âp), but the two
outer equality constraints (underlined) are crucially important to
connect the regions before and after âp. If any of these data-value
constraints are lost across joins or widens from interactions with the
shape domain, the inferred loop invariant will be too imprecise to
witness all symbolic variables and thus to synthesize short-circuiting
validation. Imagine the likelihood that some such imprecision creeps
in with arbitrarily complex data-value constraints!
Uninterpreted Shape-Data Predicates. The goal of the validated
view abstract domain is to compensate for such lost precision
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t̂
bst(m̂in, m̂ax)
 
unfold
 
fold
t̂ t̂ = null
∨
t̂
l̂
bst(m̂in, v̂)
l
v̂v
r̂
bst(v̂, m̂ax)
r
t̂ 6= null ∧ m̂in≤ v̂ ∧ v̂ < m̂ax
(a) Unfolding and folding rules for binary search tree summaries
derived from the inductive definition bst.
t̂ âp
bst(û′min, v̂p)
l
v̂pv
bst(v̂p, û′max)
r
bst(m̂in, m̂ax) bst(ûmin, ûmax) p
âp 6= null ∧ m̂in≤ ûmin = û′min ≤ v̂p < û′max = ûmax < m̂ax
(b) A precise loop invariant for a traversal of a binary search tree
using a cursor pointer p initially summarized by t̂ ·bst(m̂in, m̂ax).
Figure 5. The intertwined shape-data binary search tree invariant.
by tracking uninterpreted shape-data predicates. While it will be
uninteresting by itself, when it is combined in a reduced product [9]
with a shape-data abstraction, our validated view abstract domain
enables two key operations: (1) folding of non-invalidated memory
regions regardless of any imprecision (in the base data-value domain)
when tracking data-value constraints and (2) precise tracking of
equalities that connect data-value parameters across memory regions.
To illustrate what a validated view provides, consider in more detail
the excisemin function shown in Figure 6.
The excisemin binary search tree operation excises the node
in the tree with the minimum data value. Ignore the shaded lines
of code for the moment. The first assume (on line 1) says that the
input tree t is a binary search tree, while the second assume (on
line 2) requires that we are in the case where the root t and the
immediate left child t->l are non-null. For presentation, we focus
on this case, as it is corresponds to when excisemin loops and
thus requires loop invariant inference. The for loop on line 3 walks
down the left spine of the binary search tree until p points to the
parent node of the minimum data value node (i.e., the leftmost
leaf) as terminated by the guard on line 6. We write the loop
in this somewhat non-idiomatic way for presentation purposes to
explicitly expose the join point of the loop on line 4; a more standard
while (p->l->l != NULL) loop is equivalent and does not affect
the program analysis. On line 10, the programmer saves the data
value of the minimum node in vmin and excises the node. Finally,
the code checks that tree t is still a binary search tree with the assert
on line 12. Our overall goal is to replace this whole-data-structure
assertion at the end of the excisemin operation with a synthesized
short-circuiting validation check. Together with setroot from
Section 2, we have the helper operations for deleting a node from a
binary search tree.
Now consider the static invariant shown on line 9 right after the
minimum-finding loop. To obtain this invariant, the shape analysis
must infer a loop invariant at the head of the for loop on line 3
similar to the invariant discussed previously in Figure 5b. The
shape graph on line 9 is the same, except that the exit condition
p->l->l == NULL is reflected.
The additional annotations in the invariant on line 9 correspond to
validated view predicates that have form κ N= ε where κ ::= â ·k(v̂)
is an instance of an inductive predicate k and ε ::= ε1 N ε2 | emp | κ
is a memory region composed of disjoint instances of inductive
val excisemin(bt t) {
1 assume(t ·bst(−∞,∞)); ât = t, v̂-∞ = −∞, v̂∞ = ∞;
2 assume(t6=null∧t->l6=null); âtl = ât->l, âtr = ât->r, v̂t = ât->v;
3 bt p; for (p = t; true; p = p->l) {
4 âp = φ(ât, â1), v̂p = φ(v̂t, v̂1), â1 = φ(âtl, â2), â4 = φ(âtr, â3),
5 û1 = φ(v̂-∞, û1), û2 = φ(v̂∞, v̂p);
6 if (p->l->l == NULL) break;
7 â2 = â1->l, â3 = â1->r, v̂1 = â1->v;
8 }
9
ât âp
â1
â2 = null
â3
bst(v̂1, v̂p)
â4
bst(v̂p, û2)
bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞) bst(û1, û2)
♠t
view at âp: âp ·bst(û1, û2) N= (â1 ·bst(û1, v̂p) N â4 ·bst(v̂p, û2))
p
view at â1: â1 ·bst(û1, v̂p) N= (â2 ·bst(û1, v̂1) N â3 ·bst(v̂1, v̂p))
10 val vmin = p->l->v; p->l = p->l->r;
11
ât âp
â3
bst(v̂1, v̂p)
â4
bst(v̂p, û2)
bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞) bst(û1, û2)t p
v̂1
vmin
12 assert(t ·bst(−∞,∞)); return vmin;
}
Figure 6. Inductive shape analysis with validated views and an
instrumented programmatic valuation on excisemin, which excises
the node with the minimum data value.
predicates. The semantics of this predicate κ N= ε is a memory
region that satisfies κ up to endpoints given by ε . The predicate
κ N= ε implies the separating implication κ N− ε meaning that
((κ N= ε) N ε ⇒ κ). An important point is that a validated view
concretizes to a concrete memory, just like the shape graph. The
interpretation of the product of a shape graph and a validated view
is that the validated view constrains a sub-store described by the
shape graph. These details are described further in our formalization
(Appendix B).
The reason to use validated views is that on an unfolding, the data
constraints specified in the inductive predicate are always satisfied
on the materialized cells corresponding to the unfolded node—at
least until a modification to these materialized cells. We can see
a validated view as an uninterpreted shape-data predicate that is
applied to a materialized region until the analysis interprets an
update that could invalidate the predicate. The view at âp shown on
line 9 in Figure 6
âp ·bst(û1, û2) N= (â1 ·bst(û1, v̂p) N â4 ·bst(v̂p, û2))
governs the materialized points-to edges from âp up to â1 and
â4 (that is, the fields corresponding to p->l, p->r, and p->v).
This view predicate says that the materialized region consisting
of these three cells satisfies whatever data constraint is specified in
the “inductive step” of the inductive predicate bst: in this case,
that û1 ≤ v̂p < û2. By tracking the data-value constraints of a
materialized region in this uninterpreted manner, we are able to
infer when the shape-data invariants are preserved regardless of the
complexity of the data-value constraints.
Hypothetically, consider the worst case for data reasoning where
we have no ability to capture any data-value constraints (e.g., there
is no part of our abstraction that captures the inequality constraints
of bst) or more realistically, that important data-value constraints
were lost in widening. Even in this case, the validated view domain
enables our analysis to capture the key facts needed for folding: (1)
that the bst allowable range parameters for âp are indeed û1, û2 (and
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thus they correspond to the allowable range at the segment endpoint
âp); and (2) that the data value at âp (that is, v̂p) is in this allowable
range (û1, û2], as is required to fold into the bst predicate. Without
fact (1) maintained by validated views, the allowable range at the
segment hole (marked with♠ in Figure 6) could be inferred as some
other allowable range û′1, û
′
2. While this invariant is sound, it is too
weak to imply that the entire memory region reachable from t is a
binary search tree (i.e., ât ·bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞)).
Validated views can be seen as a combination of ideas drawing
from separation logic [24] and predicate abstraction [12], where a
set of inductive-predicate labels further constrains the heap. The
validated view domain itself can be seen as a predicate abstraction
domain and thus the abstract domain operators for validated views
are straightforward; for completeness, we give a formal description
in Appendix B.
3.2 Logic-Variable Reification
At run time, a short-circuiting validation checker must have access
to the concrete values corresponding to the symbolic logic variables
in the statically proven invariants. We provide access to these values
by using the structure of the static analysis proof to automatically
construct program expressions that correspond to logic variables.
The shaded lines in Figure 6 are the instrumentation for such
expressions. We add a new program variable for each symbolic
variable in the analysis state and initialize these variables with
expressions from what we call the programmatic valuation. For
presentation purposes, we conflate symbolic variable names with
program variables—so, for example, the assignment ât = t at line 1
is really assigning to a fresh program variable whose purpose is to
hold the symbolic value ât.
The programmatic valuation is generated by following transfer
functions of the static analysis, specifically for assume, assignment,
and join. Here, we describe how the programmatic valuation is
computed by following the excisemin example. We give details in
a more formal manner in Appendix C.
The key challenge we address is that the static analysis must be
precise enough to derive a witness to any newly introduced symbolic
variable as a program expression from the existing ones. This re-
quirement is more demanding than that for a related instrumentation
in Magill et al. [16], where the symbolic variables can be “witnessed”
by a non-deterministic value (because the output is consumed by
another static analysis as opposed to dynamic validation in our case).
In excisemin on line 1, the assignments to ât, v̂-∞, and v̂∞ come
from the interpretation of the assume to create the static analysis
state. The subsequent assignments to âtl, âtr, and v̂t on line 2
come from unfolding a bst inductive predicate at ât (stored in t).
Following the proof to find witnesses to newly introduced symbolic
variables for these commands is relatively straightforward.
The complicated case for obtaining program expression wit-
nesses is at join points, such as at line 4. We write the assignments
here using standard SSA φ notation, where the first component is
the value from the loop entry edge, and the second component is
the value from the loop back edge. On line 4, the φ -assignment
to âp shows that âp (the value of the pointer p) is ât on entry and
â1 on the loop back edge. This φ -assignment to âp is because p is
advanced via p = p->l and can be witnessed, along with the others
on this line, by following the join of the shape graphs.
The φ -assignments û1 = φ(v̂-∞, û1),û2 = φ(v̂∞, v̂p) on line 5
(also at the same join point) crucially come from following the
join with the validated view constraint. The first component of the
two assignments v̂-∞ and v̂∞ are derived from the meaning of an
empty segment between ât and âp, but the second comes from the
validated view constraint at â1 (stored in p->l). This view constraint
â1 ·bst(û1, v̂p) N= · · · (shown on line 9) allows the analysis to derive
that û1 and û2 (the allowable range at âp) are equal to û1 and v̂p (the
allowable range at â1 in the previous loop iteration), respectively.
Without this view constraint at â1, the inferred static invariant—
while sound—is not precise enough to find program expressions
that witness û1 and û2 with concrete values at run-time.
Intuitively, these φ -assignments come from computing the join
of shape invariants. As symbolic variables correspond to existential
variables, the join computes mappings from the symbolic variables
of the resulting shape invariant to the variables of the input invariants.
These mappings witness the existential variables in the resulting
invariant in terms of variables of the input invariants and thus are
reified as these φ -assignments.
Generating programmatic valuations enables an instrumenta-
tion that creates a “run-time shadow” of the static analysis state.
Crucially, even though this shadow refers to the heap, it tracks all
symbolic variables in stack locations—the instrumentation does
not add any storage on the heap. This approach allows our short-
circuiting validation to effectively incrementalize checking of data
structure invariants with a constant-space overhead rather than the
linear-space overhead of a shadow heap with dynamic memoization.
4. Synthesizing Short-Circuiting Validation
The final step of our approach is to synthesize short-circuiting checks
that incrementally validate data structure invariants. In this section,
we describe a proof-directed synthesis algorithm that generates short-
circuiting validation checks. There are two parts to this process:
(1) synthesizing calls to the short-circuiting validation checkers at
assertion sites (such as the call to bstsc in Figure 2d in Section 2);
and (2) synthesizing the code for the short-circuiting validation
checkers themselves (such as the code for bstsc itself).
Synthesis Overview. Our approach employs a static verification
to drive synthesis. Figure 7a shows the assert at the end of the
excisemin procedure from Figure 6 and the inferred shape-data
invariant (now labeled ρ̂) at that program point. From a static
verification perspective, the assert is a request to prove that the fact
ât ·bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞) holds in a sub-heap at that program point, where
ât is the symbolic value stored in program variable t. In other
words, the analysis is asked to prove the abstract inclusion ρ̂ v
ât · bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞) N true. In separation-logic–based shape analysis,
abstract inclusion is verified by unfolding and subtraction [5, 10, 25].
Subtraction-based inclusion checking ρ̂1 v ρ̂2 works by unfolding
the righthand-side ρ̂2 to match the shape structure (i.e., spatial
formulas) of the lefthand-side ρ̂1 and “subtracting” matching shapes
until the inclusion is trivial. (A base data-value domain, decision
procedure, or SMT-solver can then be used to try to discharge any
pure, data-value constraints for inclusion.)
Part 1) Synthesizing Calls to Short-Circuiting Checkers. We adapt
the standard unfolding-subtraction inclusion algorithm to synthesize
short-circuiting validation calls. We describe this algorithm subse-
quently in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2. For the moment, consider
Figure 7c, where we present the calls to short-circuiting checkers
that our approach synthesizes to replace the assert from Figure 7a.
Intuitively, our approach is to synthesize this code that corre-
sponds to an unfolding of the assertion t ·bst(−∞,∞) to match the
shape structure of the inferred static invariant ρ̂ . Here we write
bstsegsc and bstsc as calls to short-circuiting validation check-
ers corresponding to full, non–short-circuiting validation checkers
for a binary search tree segment and a complete binary search tree
bst, respectively. We synthesize calls to short-circuiting checkers
at assertion sites by (a) unfolding the assertion to match the in-
ferred static invariant and (b) replacing calls to non-short-circuiting
checkers with calls to their short-circuiting variants.
Part 2) Synthesizing Short-Circuiting Checkers. We can also
use this subtraction-directed synthesis to generate the deep short-
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
 

ρ̂ :
ât âp
â3
bst(v̂1, v̂p)
â4
bst(v̂p, û2)
bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞) bst(û1, û2)t p
v̂1
vmin
12 assert(t ·bst(−∞,∞));
(a) Assert from excisemin (Figure 6).

 

bool ksc(ds n,
val v, val hv) {
1 assume( n · k(hv) );
2 if (v == hv) return true;
3
4 return shortify( n · k(v) );
}
(b) Short-circuiting template.


 

û′1 = û1; û
′
2 = û2; assert(
bstsegsc(t, âp,−∞,∞, v̂-∞, v̂∞,
&û′1, &û
′
2, û1, û2) &&
û′1 <= âp->v && âp->v < û
′
2 &&
bstsc(â3, û′1, âp->v, v̂1, v̂p) &&
bstsc(â4, âp->v, û′2, v̂p, û2)
);
(c) Synthesized short-circuiting.
ρ̂ ∈ ˆStore ::= ρ̂1 N ρ̂2 | emp | â · f 7 v̂ | ρ̂ ∧pi | κ | κ1 N= κ2 | true
κ ::= â · k(v̂)
pi pure fact f fields k validation checker â, v̂ ∈ Vˆal symbolic variables
(d) Abstract store.
SHORTIFY-PROVEN
ρ̂ v ρ̂ ′ N true
ρ̂ ` [true ] E ρ̂ ′
SHORTIFY-EMP
pi ∧pi ′′ v pi ′
emp∧pi ` [emp∧pi ′′ ] E emp∧pi ′
SHORTIFY-UNFOLD
ρ̂ ′  unfold ρ̂ ′′′ ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′′′
ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′
SHORTIFY-SEP
ρ̂1 ` [ ρ̂ ′′1 ] E ρ̂ ′1 ρ̂2 ` [ ρ̂ ′′2 ] E ρ̂ ′2
ρ̂1 N ρ̂2 ` [ ρ̂ ′′1 uprise ρ̂ ′′2 ] E ρ̂ ′1 N ρ̂ ′2
SHORTIFY-INDUCTIVE
â · k(v̂) ` [ â · ksc(v̂′, v̂) ] E â · k(v̂′)
SHORTIFY-VALIDATE
ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′ ] E ρ̂ ′
(e) Subtraction-directed synthesis of short-circuiting validation calls.
Figure 7. Synthesizing short-circuiting validation with short-
circuiting checker templates and inductive shape analysis.
circuiting validation checkers themselves. The key observation is
that we can represent the safe replacement criterion from Section 2
in the form of a generic code template—which we show in Figure 7b
for an arbitrary non–short-circuiting checker k (here, type ds is a
generic placeholder for the data structure type in question). We can
then apply the same subtraction-directed synthesis approach that we
use in Part 1 to generate deep short-circuiting. Note the similarity
of the template to the shallow short-circuiting checker bstsc a from
Figure 3a in Section 2. We write shortify to indicate the location
where we apply short-circuiting synthesis to generate the recursive
calls.
4.1 Shortify: Subtraction-Directed Synthesis
In this subsection, we formalize our subtraction-directed short-
circuiting synthesis algorithm, which is an adaption of a standard
inclusion over stores. We assume a programmatic valuation (Sec-
tion 3.2) to convert from a symbolic variable to code that, at run
time, retrieves a concrete value represented by that variable. So, we
will, for clarity, only use symbolic variables in the remainder of this
section.
In Figure 7e, we define a judgment of the form ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′.
The judgment form is a three-place relation between the statically
proven store ρ̂ , the store to be dynamically validated ρ̂ ′′, and the
assertion store ρ̂ ′. With this judgment form, we want to derive
when it is sound to optimize assert(ρ̂ ′) in the original program to
assert(ρ̂ ′′) under the assumption of the sound statically-inferred
invariant ρ̂ . In other words, we have inferred the invariant ρ̂ and are
asked to prove an assertion ρ̂ ′, so we abduct a hypothesis ρ̂ ′′ that
allows us to prove the following implication:
ρ̂ ⇒ ((ρ̂ ′′ N true)⇒ (ρ̂ ′ N true)) (‡)
We have thus reduced our synthesis problem to an abduction
problem. The syntactic form of stores ρ̂ is given in Figure 7d,
which are separation logic formulas with inductive summaries κ
and κ1 N= κ2.
The SHORTIFY-PROVEN rule describes a degenerate case of short-
circuiting synthesis: if the analysis can prove the inclusion statically,
then there is no need to check anything dynamically and thus it can
eliminate the check (i.e., no store constraints true). The remaining
rules express the power of our approach: they enable us to go
beyond the false “all-or-nothing” dichotomy between static proof
and dynamic validation.
The SHORTIFY-EMP rule expresses the axiom for subtraction-
based inclusion—the empty store emp is contained in emp—except
that the analysis is not obligated to prove the pure constraint pi ′
assuming pi . Instead, it is permitted to leave a residual dynamic
check pi ′′.
The next two rules describe the basic decomposition of the
store for subtraction. Rule SHORTIFY-UNFOLD permits unfolding
of the assertion store ρ̂ ′. That is, it can unfold ρ̂ ′ in order to
match the structure of statically-inferred invariant ρ̂ . Existential
variables introduced as part of unfolding the ρ̂ ′ are unified with the
corresponding value in ρ̂ . To check inclusion of matching disjoint
regions, rule SHORTIFY-SEP uses the statically-inferred invariant ρ̂1 N
ρ̂2 to prove the separation constraint in assertion store ρ̂ ′1 N ρ̂
′
2. The
synthesized validation for the two regions ρ̂ ′′1 and ρ̂
′′
2 are combined
with ρ̂ ′′1 uprise ρ̂ ′′2 , which is our shorthand for (ρ̂ ′′1 N true)∧ (ρ̂ ′′2 N true)
meaning that ρ̂ ′′1 and ρ̂
′′
2 can be disjoint or overlapping. While the
rule would be sound with ρ̂ ′′1 N ρ̂
′′
2 , this more general rule emphasizes
that the separation constraint in the assertion store is proven by the
statically-inferred invariant, so the dynamic validation need not
check separation.
The SHORTIFY-INDUCTIVE rule is the key rule that leverages the
statically-inferred invariant. It attempts to synthesize short-circuiting
validation for â · k(v̂′) when the statically-inferred invariant has
shown â · k(v̂). The synthesis is guided by the statically-inferred
invariant in that the root address â and the inductive checker k
match but permits the additional arguments to be different. This rule
motivates the safe replacement criterion with the short-circuiting
checker bstsc given in Section 2. Stated in terms of ksc, the short-
circuiting checker ksc should satisfy:
â · k(v̂)⇒
(
â · ksc(v̂′, v̂)⇒ â · k(v̂′)
)
.
An application of this rule means that when asked to shortify â · k(v̂′),
we rewrite it to â · ksc(v̂′, v̂). This rewriting is sound because we have
statically proven the assumption â · k(v̂) and checking â · ksc(v̂′, v̂)
gives us the desired condition â · k(v̂′).
Separately, we need to synthesize code for the short-circuiting
invariant checker ksc itself and ensure that it satisfies its safe
replacement criterion. In Figure 7b, we show the synthesis template
for ksc. The shortify directive indicates application of this synthesis
routine to generate short-circuiting validation of n · k(v). Without
this directive, we have a shallow short-circuiting invariant checker
that satisfies its safe replacement criterion. The shortify then yields
a deep short-circuiting invariant checker.
The last rule SHORTIFY-VALIDATE is not allowed in our imple-
mentation, but we include it here for discussion. This is a degenerate
case of short-circuiting synthesis that is dual to SHORTIFY-PROVEN:
it simply gives up on using the static information ρ̂ and simply
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checks the assertion ρ̂ ′ dynamically. By disallowing this rule, we
can observe that there are no separation constraints that need to be
validated in ρ̂ ′′.
Shortifying Asserts. The final output is a code transformation
that rewrites all asserts to perform short-circuiting validation at run
time—we apply shortify to every assert(ρ̂ ′). To see intuitively why
this transformation is sound, consider such an assert(ρ̂ ′). Before
this synthesis phase, the static shape analysis will have derived the
following program assertion:
{ ρ̂ } assert(ρ̂ ′) { ρ̂ ∧ (ρ̂ ′ N true)}
where ρ̂ is the inferred invariant (i.e., the proven store) at the pro-
gram point before this assert. Now, shortification infers a predicate
ρ̂ ′′ such that the judgment ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′ holds, which means the
implication ρ̂ ⇒ ((ρ̂ ′′ N true)⇒ (ρ̂ ′ N true)) holds. Because the
post-condition of the transformed assert is
{ ρ̂ } assert(ρ̂ ′′) { ρ̂ ∧ (ρ̂ ′′ N true)} ,
we get the original post-condition using the above implication.
To state the soundness condition for E, we consider concrete
semantic domains for a concrete memory σ : Addr ⇀fin Val that
maps addresses to values where we assume the set of addresses are
contained in values (i.e., Addr⊆Val) and a valuation pi : Vˆal→Val
that maps symbolic variables to concrete values. Symbolic variables
are existential variables naming heap addresses and values, and
they form the coordinates for the base pure, data-value domain. The
concretization of an abstract store ρ̂ thus yields a pair of a concrete
memory and a valuation (i.e., 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂)).
Theorem 1 (Shortify Soundness). If 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂) and
ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′ and 〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′) where σ ′′ ⊆ σ , then 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈
γ(ρ̂ ′) for some σ ′ ⊆ σ .
This statement is a formalization of the implication shown in (‡);
a proof is given in Appendix D.
4.2 Synthesizing Short-Circuiting Segments
The previous subsection describes a procedure for synthesizing
short-circuiting validation sufficient for the setroot example in
Figure 2 and for most recursive procedures over data structures. In
particular, the previous subsection focuses on the case where the
static shape analysis need only summarize complete data structures
(e.g., a entire binary search tree). An additional challenge for static
shape analysis on iterative programs versus recursive programs is
the need to summarize prefixes of data structures. For example, in
the shape invariant shown in Figure 7a before the final assert in
excisemin, there is an inductive segment from ât to âp. Recall that
we write this segment as the formula
ât ·bst(v̂-∞, v̂∞) N= âp ·bst(û1, û2) ,
which describes a binary search tree at ât with allowable range
(v̂-∞, v̂∞] except with a hole at âp such that the binary search tree
could be completed if the hole is filled with a binary search tree with
allowable range (û1, û2]. With such inductive segments, the shape
analysis has a different kind of summary form to summarize the
binary search tree prefix from t to p.
We can synthesize short-circuiting validation for this differ-
ent summary form by introducing a new short-circuiting tem-
plate and a new SHORTIFY rule that introduces calls to this new
short-circuiting template. In Figure 7a, the inductive segment
from the root ât to the end point âp is incrementalized with a
call to a synthesized short-circuiting segment checker bstsegsc
in Figure 7c. To see how the call to bstsegsc is synthesized,
consider the new rule SHORTIFY-SEGMENT shown in Figure 8b.
This rule synthesizes a call to a short-circuiting segment checker


 

bool k1k2segsc(ds n1, ds e2, val v′1, val hv1, val* ev
′
2, val ehv2) {
1 assume((n1 · k1(hv1) N= e2 · k2(ehv2)) ∨ n1 · k1(hv1));
2 if (v′1 == hv1) { return true; }
3 if (n1 == e2) { *ev′2 = v
′
1; return true; }
4 return shortify( n1 · k1(v′1) N= e2 · k2(*ev′2) ∨ n1 · k1(v′1) );
}
(a) Short-circuiting segment checker.
SHORTIFY-SEGMENT
ρ̂ ′′ = â1 · k1k2segsc(â2, v̂′1, v̂1, v̂′2, v̂2)(
â1 · k1(v̂1) N= â2 · k2(v̂2)
)
` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E
(
â1 · k1(v̂′1) N= â2 · k2(v̂′2)
)
(b) Subtraction-directed synthesis of short-circuiting validation calls.
Figure 8. Synthesizing short-circuiting validation of inductive
segments.
k1k2segsc even when the additional arguments differ. That is, when
asked to synthesize short-circuit validation for the specific induc-
tive segment â1 · k1(v̂′1) N= â2 · k2(v̂′2), we require only a proof of
â1 · k1(v̂1) N= â2 · k2(v̂2) that may differ in the additional arguments.
Requiring this weaker property in the additional arguments is analo-
gous to the difference permitted in SHORTIFY-INDUCTIVE.
The difference that we permit in the SHORTIFY-SEGMENT rule
leads to a safe replacement criterion that the short-circuiting segment
checker k1k2segsc should satisfy:
if â1 · k1(v̂1) N= â2 · k2(v̂2)
then â1 · k1k2segsc(â2, v̂′1, v̂1, v̂′2, v̂2)⇒ (â1 · k1(v̂′1) N= â2 · k2(v̂′2))
based on its use in that rule. This safe replacement criterion moti-
vates the short-circuiting segment checker template given in Fig-
ure 8a (we have annotated the parameters with subscripts and primes
to more readily see related components). It is captured in the first
disjunct of the return condition on line 4 and the first disjunct of
the assume on line 1. If we ignore the assignment to *ev′2 on line 3
and the second disjuncts for now, we have the analogous template
as for inductives ksc—line 2 checks the short-circuiting condition.
To see where the assignment to *ev′2 comes from, let us consider
how the symbolic variables v̂′2 arise when the SHORTIFY-SEGMENT
rule is applied. Because segments are not directly specified in
assertions, this segment with symbolic variables v̂′2 must result from
unfolding during subtraction (using the SHORTIFY-UNFOLD rule) to
match the shape of the inferred invariant. For this reason, they are
not present in the analysis state and thus not in the programmatic
valuation. However, we observe that we can instrument the short-
circuiting segment checker template to find concrete witnesses
for these symbolic variables. In the case that the short-circuiting
condition applies (line 2), it must be the case that v̂′2 = v̂2, that is, the
arguments at the end point â2 correspond to the statically-inferred
invariant. Our synthesis procedure will thus initialize the contents
of *ev′2 to ehv2 at the top-level call site, as we have shown with the
assignments to û′1 and û
′
2 with û1 and û2, respectively, in Figure 7c.
In the case that we reach the endpoint e on line 3, we witness v̂′2
with v̂1 using the assignment *ev = v using the semantics of the
empty segment.
This template design enables additional precision in dynamic
validation. Alternatively, we could strengthen the static obligation
so that v̂′2 = v̂2 (i.e., disallow a difference between the additional
arguments at â2) at the cost that short-circuiting applies less often.
Finally, the second disjuncts of the return condition on line 4 and
the assume on line 1 are another optimization in our template design.
An inductive segment κ1 N= κ2 is defined by unfolding κ1 until it
either terminates in a base case or matches κ2 (cf. Section 3.1).
The second disjuncts generalize the replacement criterion so that
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this short-circuiting checker can also be used in the context the
static analysis has proven n · k(hv), that is, where there is a full
validation from n with no endpoint. This additional assumption
permits this same short-circuiting checker to be used in the recursive
calls generated by shortify at line 4, regardless of whether the
recursive check is a full validation or a segment.
Discussion: Limitations and Generalizations. Fundamentally,
synthesizing short-circuiting validation checkers from templates
requires proving implications in inductive separation logic and thus
is necessarily incomplete. To synthesize from the templates shown
in Figures 7b and 8a, we unfold once in the assume on line 1 and
in the return on line 4. This strategy is effective at proving the
implication of interest for common inductive definitions, like bst,
that unfold “one-node-at-a-time”—but, in general, is not guaranteed
to succeed.
As we can observe from the above discussion about inductive
segments, there is a design trade-off between the SHORTIFY rules
and the short-circuiting templates. The SHORTIFY rules specify the
desired weaker static verification obligation, which dictates the
remaining obligation that must be satisfied by the synthesized short-
circuiting checker. In this paper, we have asked the static verifi-
cation to prove the same structure (cf. SHORTIFY-INDUCTIVE and
SHORTIFY-SEGMENT) with potentially different additional arguments.
This design decision leads to short-circuiting templates that are both
effective in realizing short-circuiting validation and reasonable to
synthesize. But clearly, this choice is simply one in a potentially
large design space. The dynamic validation of different kinds of
summaries may be shortified with a similar approach using dif-
ferent SHORTIFY rules but potentially requiring different synthesis
strategies for short-circuiting checker templates.
5. Empirical Evaluation
We test our short-circuiting validation approach using a prototype
implementation called DIVVA. In particular, we seek to test the
following expectations: (1) Theoretical asymptotic improvements
from short-circuiting translate to dramatic empirical speedups in run-
time validation on workloads even assuming worst-case inference
imprecision in the static verifier. (2) Short-circuiting validation is
effective even when the pre-conditions are too weak to imply the
validated post-condition (i.e., when it is not sound to eliminate the
post-condition). (3) The absence of a shadow heap in DIVVA results
in incremental validation with low overhead.
Experimental Setup and Static Analysis Time. We use DIVVA
to incrementally verify-validate the set of workloads shown in
Figure 9a. Each data structure has an invariant validation checker
that requires numerical constraints on the data structure contents. All
workloads consist of repeatedly applying a data structure operation
assuming the data structure invariant holds on input and then
asserting that the data structure invariant again holds for the output.
We consider both classic data structures, such as ordered singly-
linked lists (olist) and binary search trees (bst), as well as
structures less commonly considered by static verifiers: treaps
(treap) and hash tries (hashtrie). A treap is a randomized version
of a binary search tree that is heap-ordered on a set of randomly-
generated priorities; a hash trie is a tree-structured hash map that
uses bit-blocks from hash keys to form a trie [3]—challenging
even for state-of-the-art static verification. And even for binary
search trees—where the invariant seems amenable to current static
reasoning techniques—certain operations like deletion (that have
non-local modification) can be surprisingly challenging to verify
statically compared to simpler operations like insertion [15]. Our
validated views domain handles these structures for short-circuiting
synthesis because it can preserve uninterpreted data constraints on
unmodified regions.
m iVV slowdown speedup
workload (K) (s) wrt noV wrt dynV
olist m concats 1,180 1.163 1.07x 2.1x
olist m drops 600 0.053 1.01x 230000 x
olist m inserts 24 1.185 1.12x 2.8x
olist m deletes 23 1.087 1.08x 2.9x
olist 50-50 27 1.195 1.10x 2.8x
bst m inserts 200 0.075 1.40x 5600 x
bst m deletemins 460 0.087 1.66x 83000 x
bst m exciseroots 380 0.157 2.80x 26000 x
bst m deletes 170 0.097 1.76x 3300 x
bst 50-50 170 0.079 1.41x 360 x
treap m deletes 900 1.171 1.12x 3.9x
treap m inserts 970 1.399 1.35x 3.3x
treap 50-50 660 1.151 1.09x 2.3x
hashtrie m writes 140 0.230 4.35x 9300 x
hashtrie 50-50 280 0.305 5.78x 1000 x
geometric mean 1.54x −
(a) Execution time of data structure workloads with short-circuiting incre-
mental verification-validation (iVV); no validation (noV); and full dynamic
validation (dynV). The workloads execute m data structure operations—with
a dynamic validation check between each operation in the dynV and iVV
variants. We chose the number of operations m to ensure that the workloads
run long enough to accurately measure elapsed time. For most workloads,
the fastest variant (that with no validation, noV) takes at least 1 second. In
cases where the slowest, fully dynamic validation variant (dynV) would not
finish within hours on that size, we chose m to ensure that the variant without
validation (noV) takes a minimum of 0.05s. These workloads are compiled
with gcc -O2 and measured on an Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q6600 2.40GHz
with 4G RAM. The time reported is averaged over 12 runs.
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(b) Short-circuiting incremental verification-validation does not change the
apparent complexity of bst m insertdeletes. The iVV line shows the
cost of m validated operations on a data structure of size n. The noV line
shows the cost on the original, unvalidated code.
Figure 9. Effectiveness of incremental verification-validation.
To stress test our approach, we intentionally instantiate the shape-
data analyzer in DIVVA with the “most lossy” data domain. This
domain can only keep constraints in straight-line code and loses all
of them (i.e., goes to >) at any join point. Complex operations,
like bit operations, are treated as uninterpreted functions. This
imprecision represents the scenario in which the data property is out
of reach of static verification.
We measured the static analysis time to infer invariants for our
examples. As our primary concern is not the efficiency of the static
analysis, our data-value domain is not particularly optimized. It
calls the Z3 SMT-solver for inclusion checking. The total analysis
time for all our examples was 640.2s. It is likely that improved
engineering can lower the analysis time by making fewer SMT calls.
If we exclude the Z3 time, then the remaining analysis time was
27.9s.
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Incrementalized Run-Time Validation Cost on Workloads. In
Figure 9a, we report the cost and benefit of incrementalized run-time
validation for a variety of data structure workloads. The measure-
ments under ‘iVV’ show the execution time with synthesized short-
circuiting dynamic validation. The subsequent columns give the
slowdown of iVV over no validation (‘noV’) and speedup of iVV
over dynamic validation (‘dynV’). The dynV configuration runs
C-style data structure invariant checks that dynamically validate
the data constraints for the complete structure but do not validate
separation properties. This configuration provides more checking
than noV, but it is still weaker than iVV, which checks separation
properties statically. Note that strengthening dynV to dynamically
validate separation can only make the iVV speedups larger. We
provide only the speedups here, but we give the detailed execution
times in Appendix A.
For ordered singly-linked lists olist, concat iteratively con-
catenates sub-lists until reaching a list of size m, drop drops the first
element of the list m times from a list of size m, insert performs
ordered insertion m times from an empty list, delete performs
element deletion m times from a list of size m. For binary search tree
bst, insert performs search tree insertion, deletemin deletes the
minimum element, exciseroot excises the root node, and delete
does search tree deletion. For treaps treap, search tree rotations
are performed on insertion and deletion to restore the heap-ordering
invariant; we perform validation after each rotation. For hash tries
hashtrie, write writes to the hash trie, and we validate that the
hash key of each element is along the correct path in the trie for the
last 14 levels; this dynamic validation limit is because of the lack
of arbitrary precision integers in C. The 50-50 workloads consist of
a randomly-selected sequence of insert and delete operations with
50-50 split of each kind; the data structure size for these workloads
was 10K nodes, except for the treap workloads, which were at
1M nodes. The code for hashtrie write along with its invariant
checker is given in Appendix E.
In most cases, our iVV approach brings the slowdown with
respect to the noV configuration back down to within a factor of
1.76x. One exception is exciseroot: this workload is a bad case for
short-circuiting because the operation itself requires just one O(lgn)
walk from the root, while the theoretically ideal short-circuiting
validation has to perform three O(lgn) walks. This larger slowdown
is thus consistent with our expectations. We discuss the exceptions
in the hashtrie workloads further below.
The speedup column shows the improvement of incremental-
ized verification-validation (iVV) over non-short-circuiting, whole-
structure dynamic validation (dynV). We expect short-circuiting
to obtain asymptotic improvements over dynV (or rather, recover
the asymptotic losses of the dynV variant over the unchecked noV
configuration). Our expectation is supported by the measurements
shown in Figure 9a: the cases with single-digit factor speedups are
those where there is no change in asymptotic complexity between
noV and dynV, while the cases with multiple order-of-magnitude
speedups are those where there is a change in asymptotic complex-
ity (the exact factors are thus not meaningful). Recall that dynamic
validation does not check separation properties—these performance
improvements are on top of the additional separation assurances
provided by our static verifier.
We obtain these speedups with relatively unoptimized instrumen-
tation. We never eliminate any asserts entirely—we only replace
non-short-circuiting, whole-structure assertions (like on line 4 in
Figure 2c) with calls to short-circuiting checkers (like on line 4 in
Figure 2d). To focus our measurements on short-circuiting, we do
not eliminate data invariant asserts (e.g., x < y) even when they are
known to hold statically. Removing such statically-proven asserts
would especially improve the hashtrie workloads. For the other
data structures, the data invariant at each node is a constant-time
check. But for hashtrie, the data invariant check involves recom-
puting the hash key of an element, which is a O(lgn) operation
(adding a O(lgn) factor over noV but better than the O(n) factor
added by dynV).
Overall, these workload performance measurements are quite
promising, particularly given the two intentional worst-case choices
of (1) no assert eliminations even when they are statically known;
and (2) a worst-case base data-value domain. Applying static verifi-
cation techniques to data-value reasoning, instead of hamstringing
it, would only improve the run-time performance of iVV.
When Pre-Conditions are Insufficient to Verify. Not only can
DIVVA incrementalize to make up for inference imprecision in static
analysis, but it can also tolerate “insufficient” pre-condition speci-
fications. Insufficient pre-condition specifications are ones that are
not strong enough for any static verifier to soundly eliminate check-
ing the post-condition (like the setroot example from Figure 2).
Here, the concat example and both treap examples use insufficient
pre-conditions. For the concat example, the pre-condition for each
input is that they are both ordered lists with a lower bound parameter
of −∞. For the treap examples, the pre-condition to the rotation
operation is that both sub-trees have binary search tree bounds of
(−∞,∞). DIVVA generates a short-circuiting validation that checks
that the observed concrete instances satisfy the post-condition. This
synthesized validation soundly fails when passing concrete inputs
that would violate the data structure invariant (e.g., when passing
two individually ordered lists to concat whose concatenation is not
an ordered list).
Low Overhead Validation. As we have seen, incrementalizing dy-
namic validation checks can improve their asymptotic complexity—
and, in some cases, even recover the complexity of the original,
unvalidated operation while providing safety guarantees. Recall the
binary search tree example from Figure 1—there, adding whole-
data-structure validation to insert and delete operations changed the
asymptotic complexity from O(lgn) to O(n), but applying DIVVA’s
short-circuiting approach retained the benefits of dynamic validation
without changing the complexity of the operation.
In Figure 9b, we show a plot of iVV and noV execution times
on a workload of m binary search tree insertdelete operations
(this is the plot from Figure 1 with the dynV curve removed). An
insertdelete performs a deletion of a random element followed
immediately by the re-insertion of the same element (this keeps
the data structure size n constant over the m operations); here we
fix m = 1 million so that the workload execution time is easily
measurable (on the order of 1 second) on even the smallest data
structure size. We performed k = 12 trials at each data structure size
n. The error bars (though negligible) show two standard deviations.
Over this range, the slowdown of iVV over noV ranges from
1.11x (for the largest insertdelete workloads) to 2.55x (for
the smallest). We use this same data to estimate the asymptotic
slowdown—the slowdown in the limit, as the number of nodes
in the tree increases—by fitting to equations of the form time =
b+c · lg(size). The asymptotic slowdown is then ciVV/cnoV—which
we estimate to a 95% confidence interval to be 4.7% ± 1.4. (For
completeness, we provide both a plot of slowdown vs. workload
size and the details of this fitting in Appendix A).
This asymptotic slowdown of 4.7% compares quite favorably
with purely dynamic approaches to validation. While not a direct
comparison, the overhead for Ditto ranges from 2.5x to 50x, depend-
ing on the data structure [28]. Such dynamic techniques are quite
general but must maintain sizable run-time structures in a shadow
heap. In contrast, when static shape analysis is possible—and it
often is—then DIVVA’s combined verification-validation approach
allows for a much lower overhead.
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6. Related Work
Several ways of combining pointer-shape reasoning and data-value
reasoning have been proposed, including [6, 7, 17]. Magill et al. [16]
proposes a sequence of two analyses: a shape analysis followed by
an off-the-shelf scalar value analysis. The kind of invariants that we
consider require a tight integration of pointer-shape and data-value
reasoning, which may be difficult to realize in a pipelined approach.
Incremental verification-validation can be seen as supplementing
these approaches with the ability to discharge complex data-value
constraints on heap contents at run-time in a fine-grained manner
(whereas simpler data-value constraints can still be discharged
statically). There is a wealth of static verification techniques for
data structure properties that combine pointer-shape and data-value
constraints, including [19, 21, 22, 31] amongst many others, that use
user-supplied loop invariants and try to discharge proof obligations
using solvers and decision procedures. Zee et al. [31] aim to verify
not only rich shape-numerical data structure properties but also
functional properties of algorithms that operate on them. Our
technique is complementary: it offers more automation and the
opportunity to discharge the hardest constraints dynamically. In
another line of work, Christakis et al. [8] proposed using dynamic
validation to study unsound assumptions made by static analysis
tools. In contrast, our approach uses dynamic validation to check
unverified assertions from a sound static analysis (i.e., assertions
that the analysis could not prove statically).
Prior approaches to run-time checking of expressive heap as-
sertions includes work that parallelizes validation [30], allows
user-specified overhead budgets [2], checks separation proper-
ties [20], and piggybacks on the GC with an expressive assertion
language [23]. In this space, our work is most related to Ditto [27]
where our bottom-line goal is the same: to incrementalize data
structure validation checks. We present a complementary approach
that offers different trade-offs. For example, our memory overhead
is dictated by the size of static shape invariants that are independent
of the size of the concrete data structure instances. Incremental
computation [1, 13, 14] has been used for improving execution effi-
ciency in general, beyond data structure validation checks. The basic
principle is to memoize intermediate results and reuse them when
a dependency is discovered. Our approach can be seen as a static
analogue to these principles, applying static analysis to “statically
memoize” validation checks so that only a single short-circuiting
check at the root is needed to reuse the results for the entire sub-tree.
7. Conclusion
We have presented a proof-directed approach to synthesizing short-
circuiting dynamic validation checks for data structures with com-
plex data invariants. A short-circuiting checker stops checking when-
ever it detects at run time that an assertion for some sub-structure
has been proven statically. The key insight of our approach is to
obtain a static verification for an existential weakening of the orig-
inal property of interest and then to use this proof to synthesize
short-circuiting validation. To achieve this technically, we first de-
fined an enrichment of inductive shape analysis with validated views.
This abstract domain enables run-time reification of static logic vari-
ables and precisely tracks uninterpreted data invariants in unmodi-
fied regions. Finally, we described a subtraction-directed synthesis
technique that abducts short-circuiting validation checks for data
constraints using the statically-inferred invariants.
The result is a hybrid technique that strikes a unique balance
of static verification and dynamic validation for data structure in-
variants. On one hand, our technique provides benefit with efficient
dynamic validation when faced with the inevitable imprecision of
statically inferred data invariants on inductive structures. On the
other hand, our technique leverages static verification to provide
additional static assurances (i.e., separation properties) and sub-
stantially lower the run-time overhead of dynamic validation—in
many cases recovering the complexity of the original unsafe and
unvalidated code.
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A. Data Structure Workloads
Table 1 gives the execution times over our workloads from Section 5
on the no validation (noV) and the full, non-incrementalized (dynV)
variants. These workloads are compiled with gcc -O2 and measured
on an Intel Core 2 Quad CPU Q6600 2.40GHz with 4G RAM. The
time reported is averaged over 12 runs.
A.1 Analysis of BST insertdelete Workload
In this subsection, we provide additional details for the measure-
ments of the overhead of iVV over noV that we reported in Section 5.
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Figure 10. Ratio of insertdelete execution times under incre-
mental verification-validation (iVV) and for the original, unsafe
code (noV).
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(a) Linear fittings of lg-transformed curve.
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(b) Spread of residuals for fitted curves.
Figure 11. We estimate the asymptotic overhead of our approach on
the BST insertdelete workload by fitting lg-transformed curves.
Behavior Over Measured Range. In Figure 10, we show the
ratio of iVV execution times over noV executions for the BST
insertdelete over the range of tree sizes that we measured (up to
50 million nodes). The slowdown of iVV for our validation (over
the original unsafe, unvalidated code) ranges from around 1.11x (for
the largest insertdelete workloads) to 2.55x (for the smallest).
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σ : (Addr ⇀fin Val) = Mem pi : (Vˆal→ Val) = Valua
(a) Concrete domains.
σ̂ ∈ ˆMem ::= σ̂ 1 ∨ σ̂ 2 | ⊥ | ρ̂ abstract memory
ρ̂ ∈ ˆStore ::= ρ̂1 N ρ̂2 | emp | â · f 7 v̂ | ρ̂ ∧pi exact
| κ | κ1 N= κ2 | ρ̂? ω̂ summaries, views
pi ∈ ˆValua data-value domain
ω̂ ∈ ˆView ::= κ N= ε | true | ω̂1uprise ω̂2 validated views
κ ::= â · k(v̂) ε ::= ε1 N ε2 | emp | κ â, v̂ ∈ Vˆal symbolic variables
f fields k validation checker
(b) A memory abstraction with validated views.
UNFOLD-FRAME
ρ̂  unfold ρ̂ ′
ρ̂0 N ρ̂
 
unfold ρ̂0 N ρ̂ ′
UNFOLD-VIEW
â · k(v̂)  unfold ρ̂ N ε
â · k(v̂)  unfold (ρ̂ N ε)? (â · k(v̂) N= ε)
UNFOLD-SEGVIEW
(â · k(v̂) N= κ)  unfold ρ̂ N ε N (κ ′ N= κ)
(â · k(v̂) N= κ)  unfold (ρ̂ N ε N (κ ′ N= κ))? (â · k(v̂) N= (ε N κ ′))
(c) Introducing validated views on unfolding.
Figure 12. Abstracting memory with shape-data constraints and
validated views.
Estimated Asymptotic Slowdown. We also performed an analysis
to estimate the asymptotic slowdown of iVV vs. noV—that is, the
slowdown in the limit, as the size of the tree grows to infinity. To
estimate this slowdown, we fit a suffix (starting at 15 million nodes)
of the data from Figure 9b to equations of the form:
time = b+ c · lg(size)
The asymptotic slowdown is then ciVV/cnoV—which we estimate
to a 95% confidence interval to be 4.7% ± 1.4. We show the fitted
lines in Figure 11a. The coefficients of determination (R2) for the
fit for iVV is 0.984; that for noV is 0.995. The lack of a trend in the
spread of the residuals (Figure 11b) for these fits provides evidence
for a linear relationship between execution time and lg(size).
B. The Validated View Abstraction
In Figure 12, we enrich a separation-logic–based shape abstraction
with validated views. The concrete semantic domains are a concrete
memory σ that maps addresses to values where we assume the
set of addresses are contained in values (i.e., Addr ⊆ Val) and
a valuation pi that maps symbolic variables to concrete values.
Symbolic variables are existential variables naming heap addresses
and values; they form the coordinates for the base pure, data-
value domain ˆValua. A valuation pi assigns meaning to symbolic
variables and thus is the concrete domain element that corresponds
to an abstract element pi of the data-value abstract domain (i.e.,
pi ∈ γ ˆValua(pi)).
We consider an abstract memory σ̂ to be a disjunction of abstract
stores ρ̂ . Our focus is not on the shape abstraction, but we briefly
describe one on which we can discuss the validated view layer ω̂ .
Considering just the top line defining abstract stores, we have an
exact abstraction of a finite concrete memory constrained by the
base data-value domain element pi (i.e., analogous to two-valued
structures in TVLA [26]). The next line adds summarization that
enriches the abstraction to unbounded memory, including inductive
validation checker constraints κ ::= â · k(v̂)—corresponding to a
region of memory from address â that satisfies validation checker
c with actual arguments v̂. We write an overline · for a sequence of
items. We write κ1 N= κ2 for a segment generalization of inductive
predicate κ1 to a hole at κ2, which is defined by syntactic unfolding
of κ1 up to the hole κ2 [7]. We can see an abstract store as a
separating shape graph by treating ρ̂ as a finite map from base
addresses â to field edges â · f 7 v̂ or summary edges like â · k(v̂)
or κ1 N= κ2. The concrete domain element corresponding to an
abstract store (without views) is a set of pairs of a concrete memory
σ and a valuation pi (i.e., 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂)). We assume any base shape
abstraction of interest comes equipped with a concretization of this
form.
Our extension is that an abstract store can be constrained by a
view ρ̂? ω̂ (shown shaded). A validated view predicate ω̂ : κ N= ε
is an inductive segment with multiple potential endpoints ε ::= ε1 N
ε2 | emp | κ (hence, we reuse the N= connective). The concretization
of a view also yields a set of concrete memory-valuation pairs.
That is, a view is a spatial formula—a memory abstraction itself.
The concretization of a ω̂ : κ N= ε can be defined by syntactically
unfolding κ until matching the endpoints in ε .
A key point is that a validated view concretizes to a memory-
valuation pair that constrains a sub-store of the “main” abstract
store (i.e., the shape graph). In particular, the concretization of the
constraining or restriction of an abstract store with a validated view
ρ̂? ω̂ is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Concretization of a View-Constrained Store).
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂? ω̂)
iff 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂) and 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ω̂) such that σ ′ ⊆ σ .
In other words, using the syntax and semantics of connectives
from separation logic, we can see ρ̂ ? ω̂ as being equivalent
to ρ̂ ∧ (ω̂ N true)—we weaken ω̂ to the strongest intuitionistic
assertion weaker than ω̂ [24] before conjoining it with ρ̂ .
Example 1 (Concretization of a Validated View). For the following
example validated view, we give one element of its concretization
(i.e., 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ ˆView(ω̂)). Other elements include memories with
further unfoldings of the left or right sub-trees of pi(â1): there are
simply two holes somewhere because of the arbitrary allowable
ranges given the symbolic variables û1–û6. Observe that if there are
some equality constraints on û1–û6, then that can have an effect on
where the holes are allowed in the concretization.
ω̂ : â1 ·bst(û1, û6) N= (â2 ·bst(û2, û3) N â3 ·bst(û4, û5))
σ : [pi(â1) ·l 7 pi(â2),pi(â1) ·r 7 pi(â3),pi(â1) ·v 7 pi(v̂1)]
pi s.t. pi(û1) = pi(û2)≤ pi(û3) = pi(v̂1) = pi(û4)< pi(û5) = pi(û6)
While not strictly necessary, the remaining forms of views ω̂
enable us to speak about all the view predicates as a whole applied
to the “main” store. The unit ω̂ : true is the view that abstracts any
concrete memory (as in separation logic), while ω̂1 uprise ω̂2 is the
symmetric version of ?. More precisely, the concretization is
〈σ unionmultiσ1unionmultiσ2,pi〉 ∈ γ(ω̂1uprise ω̂2)
iff 〈σ unionmultiσ1,pi〉 ∈ γ(ω̂1) and 〈σ unionmultiσ2,pi〉 ∈ γ(ω̂2)
where we write unionmulti to union maps with disjoint domains, that is,
the sub-store with common addresses in ω̂1 and ω̂2 must be the
same σ . Or in terms of separation logic, ω̂1uprise ω̂2 corresponds to
(ω̂1 N true)∧ (ω̂2 N true). Note that we can always weaken any
store ρ̂ to apply views at the top-level (i.e., (ρ̂1? ω̂1) N (ρ̂2? ω̂2)
implies (ρ̂1 N ρ̂2)? (ω̂1uprise ω̂2) as desired).
Introducing and Eliminating Views. The key difference between
a validated view ω̂ and a “main” store abstraction ρ̂ is how they
are treated in static analysis. While inductive summaries in the
main store are unfolded to materialize fields for strong updates and
then reintroduced to over-approximate loop invariants, a validated
view on the store is auxiliary information that is dropped when
potentially invalidated (somewhat like a predicate abstraction [12]).
This distinction is why we can use inductive multi-segments for
views even though we expect them to be very difficult to work with
in the “main store.”
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For an inductive validation checker instance κ like â ·bst(û1, û2),
the corresponding inductive definition yields an unfolding relation
κ  unfold ρ̂ for each disjunctive case of the inductive definition while
replacing formal parameters with actual arguments (cf., Figure 5a in
Section 3). For example, the following are in the unfolding relation
for bst:
â ·bst(û1, û2)  unfold (â ·l 7 â1 N â ·r 7 â2 N â ·v 7 v̂
N â1 ·bst(û1, v̂) N â2 ·bst(v̂, û2)∧ û1 ≤ v̂ < û2)
â ·bst(û1, û2)  unfold emp∧ â = null
Similarly, we assume an unfolding relation for inductive segment in-
stances κ ′ N= κ  unfold ρ̂ . Given these axioms, we can then lift this syn-
tactic unfolding relation to stores ρ̂  unfold ρ̂ ′ by non-deterministically
selecting a summary to unfold (UNFOLD-FRAME in Figure 12c).
A view constraint is introduced on unfolding a summary in the
store to strengthen the resulting state. We define these strengthenings
with the remaining two rules in Figure 12c. Rule UNFOLD-VIEW is
for unfolding an inductive predicate where the endpoints ε are
given by the recursive validation checkers in the definition of k.
For unfolding bst in the above, the endpoints ε would correspond
to the two recursive calls â1 · bst(û1, v̂) N â2 · bst(v̂, û2) in the
non-null case. The unfolding of a segment is similarly defined
in UNFOLD-SEGVIEW: it can result in a new segment whose begin
point is κ ′ that becomes an endpoint of the view. On an update,
our abstract transformer simply and soundly drops any view that
constrains the updated field. For example, on line 11 in Figure 6,
there are no remaining views because of the update to p->l and the
dropping of â1. From the perspective of the graph representation, it
is straightforward to track the set of views that constrain each field
edge.
Inclusion, Join, and Widen. To define the standard abstract do-
main operations, such as the inclusion v, join unionsq, and widen O
operators, we need a correspondence between the symbolic vari-
ables (i.e., the set of names) used in each abstract element. We call
such a correspondence a valuation transformer
Ψ : Vˆal ⇀fin Vˆal .
This map gives an instantiation of existentials in one element in
terms of existentials in the other.
We assume the shape-data abstraction (without views) comes
equipped with an abstract inclusion relation
Ψ ` ρ̂ v ρ̂ ′
that over-approximates inclusion under concretization with the
variables in ρ̂ ′ renamed to the variables in ρ̂ using Ψ. Formally,
γ(ρ̂)⊆ {〈σ ,pi〉 ∣∣ 〈σ ,pi ◦Ψ〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′)} .
The setup is analogous for the abstract join operation
Ψ1,Ψ2 ` ρ̂1unionsq ρ̂2 ↪→ ρ̂ ′ ,
except that we need a pair of valuation transformers Ψ1,Ψ2 mapping
the variables in the result element to each of the input elements.
For inclusion, joins, and widen of validated views, we treat a view
predicate as uninterpreted, so the domain structure is straightforward.
Treating a view ω̂ as a finite set of view predicates interpreted
conjunctively with uprise, abstract inclusion is the set inclusion in the
reverse direction among the set of view predicates up to renaming
with the valuation transformer Ψ; true is the top element; join is set
intersection up to renaming; widen can be join because it satisfies
the ascending chain property.
For the overall abstract domain combining shape-data abstraction
with views, we define these operations point-wise
Ψ1,Ψ2 ` ρ̂1unionsq ρ̂2 ↪→ ρ̂ ′ Ψ1,Ψ2 ` ω̂1unionsq ω̂2 ↪→ ω̂ ′
Ψ1,Ψ2 ` ρ̂1? ω̂1unionsq ρ̂2? ω̂2 ↪→ ρ̂ ′? ω̂ ′
The key piece is that they share the same valuation transformers: that
is, the join of the view domain additionally constrains the valuation
transformers, which is the crucial precision needed to connect the
summaries around a hole (cf., the allowable range for bst marked
with ♠ in Figure 6).
Reductions and Precision. The validated view domain is de-
signed to compensate for inductive imprecision in the base data-
value domain by enabling new reductions [9] (i.e., exchange of
information) between the pointer-shape, data-value, and view com-
ponents of an abstract store ρ̂ . A view â · k(v̂) N= ε can be used to
fold the shape from â provided ε can be shown to hold by either
constraints in the shape or view components regardless of the data-
value constraints. Also, important equalities connecting parameters
in unmodified, “adjacent” regions of the shape graph (cf., Figure 5b)
are easily maintained by the view domain. These equalities are typi-
cally difficult to derive when widening shape abstractions because
the summarization of regions are considered independently in a
separation logic-based analysis. While the design of the validated
view domain is to compensate for imprecise data-value domains, on
the flip side, reduction can be applied to derive a view ω̂ when the
pointer-shape and data-value constraints in ρ̂ can be shown to imply
it (i.e., ρ̂ v ω̂). This could be useful to “save” information in a view
from data-value constraints derived in straight-line code that may
be lost on widening.
Overall, the validated view domain remembers all programm-
er-asserted inductive validations of the heap that have not been
possibly invalidated by a heap write. As we will see (Section 4),
we can synthesize calls to short-circuiting checkers that use these
remembered validated views as hypotheses (cf. Figure 2d) and thus
avoid checking parts of the heap that have not changed with respect
to the data structure invariant.
C. Computing Programmatic Valuations
We express a programmatic valuation as a finite map
pˇi : Vˆal ⇀fin Expr×ProgLoc×N .
A pˇi is flow-insensitive (i.e., is the same within in a lexical scope) and
maps from symbolic variables to a triple of (1) a program expression
e ∈ Expr involving the program variables x or symbolic variables v̂;
(2) a program location ` ∈ ProgLoc for where the SSA-assignment
should be instrumented; and (3) a disjunction index i. Because an
abstract memory σ̂ is a disjunction of stores
∨
i ρ̂ i, we assume every
store ρ̂ is indexed with a globally unique number given by disj(ρ̂).
At any location ` where we need to apply instrumentation, if there
is more than one disjunct in the inferred abstract memory σ̂ at `
then we generate generate an if-else on a special instrumentation
variable that stores the disjunction of interest from disj(ρ̂). Thus,
we can assume we are working with single stores ρ̂ .
Assuming the static analysis computes an invariant map from
each program location ` to an abstract memory σ̂ that over-
approximates the set of possible concrete memories at `, we can
express the analysis proof by annotating the program with these
inferred invariants σ̂ . For computing the programmatic valuation,
we do not need the annotated invariants at all program locations,
but rather only in the cases where the analysis introduced new sym-
bolic variables. To make these locations explicit, we augment the
command language c from the underlying programming language
(e.g., C) with a few annotated commands cˇ to express these analysis
operations. The control-flow of the program remains unchanged
(e.g., the statement language s in Figure 13 has commands cˇ labeled
with a program location `, sequencing, etc.).
In Figure 13, we give the annotated commands of interest, which
record the static analysis operations that introduce new symbolic
variables (except memory allocation, whose instrumentation is
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program commands c statements s ::= ` : cˇ | s1;s2 | · · ·
annotated commands cˇ ::= c | assume x · k(y) {ρ̂} | unfold κ {ρ̂}
| join(Ψ1, ρ̂1;Ψ2, ρ̂2) {ρ̂}
â · k(v̂) ∈ ρ̂ â = ρ̂(η̂(x)) v̂ = ρ̂(η̂(y)) i = disj(ρ̂)
pˇi[â 7→ 〈x, `, i〉][̂v 7→ 〈y, `, i〉] ` ` : assume x · k(y) {ρ̂}
i = disj(ρ̂)
pˇi [̂v 7→ 〈e, `, i〉 | e ∈ bind(κ  unfold ρ̂)] ` ` : unfold κ {ρ̂}
pˇi = pˇi ′ [̂v 7→ 〈φ(v̂1, v̂2), `, i〉 | v̂ 7→ v̂1 ∈Ψ1 and v̂ 7→ v̂2 ∈Ψ2] i = disj(ρ̂)
pˇi ` ` : join(Ψ1, ρ̂1;Ψ2, ρ̂2) {ρ̂}
pˇi ` ` : c
pˇi ` s1 pˇi ` s2
pˇi ` s1;s2 · · ·
Figure 13. Computing the programmatic valuation pˇi .
straightforward). These commands are annotated with the inferred
post-state. The assume x · k(y) {ρ̂} command indicates that the
analysis assumed a data structure validation check x · k(y) yield-
ing a post-store ρ̂ where x,y are original program variables. The
unfold κ {ρ̂} command makes explicit the unfolding of an inductive
predicate κ; and the join(Ψ1, ρ̂1;Ψ2, ρ̂2) {ρ̂} command indicates
a join of two input stores ρ̂1, ρ̂2 along with their corresponding
valuation transformers Ψ1,Ψ2.
We describe the generation of a pˇi via the judgment form pˇi ` ` : cˇ,
which says that pˇi is a programmatic valuation for analysis command
cˇ at program location `. The analogous judgment form pˇi ` s simply
walks over the program structure to constrain pˇi . The definition of
this judgment is sketched in the last line of Figure 13 with the one
rule for statement sequencing s1;s2, and we can see these rules as
the checking system for a flow-insensitive fixed-point computation
starting from the empty map. We assume an implicit, fixed parameter
to this judgment η̂ for an abstract environment mapping program
variables to symbolic variables for the current static scope. For
simplicity, we let the symbolic variables in the abstract environment
denote the address of the corresponding program variables and let
the abstract store hold the value of the variable.
For assume, we “initialize” the programmatic valuation pˇi by
finding a correspondence between the validation check x · k(y)
and a shape fact â · k(v̂) in terms of program variables. We add
bindings to pˇi mapping the symbolic variables â and v̂ in the
inductive predicate to the program variable arguments x and y,
respectively. The mapping also remembers the program location `
and the store disjunct i. On unfolding an inductive predicate â ·k(v̂),
we need to extend the programmatic valuation pˇi with bindings
for the existentials introduced in the definition of k. Because all
inductive definitions used in our static shape analysis are derived
from executable specifications (e.g., static verification predicate bst
from dynamic validation checker bst), program expressions must
exist that witness an instantiation for each existential. In other words,
any existential introduced in an inductive definition must correspond
to the value of an argument or from reading a field. We write
this instantiation for an unfolding as bind(κ  unfold ρ̂). For example,
the bind function for the second disjunct in bst from Figure 2a is
[̂v 7→ (̂t->v), l̂ 7→ (̂t->l), r̂ 7→ (̂t->r)]. The instrumentation at line 2
and line 7 in Figure 6 come from applying this rule.
Finally, we consider joins join(Ψ1, ρ̂1;Ψ2, ρ̂2) {ρ̂}. Our conven-
tion is that the set of symbolic variables in ρ̂ are fresh with respect
to ρ̂1 and ρ̂2, so we must extend the programmatic valuation pˇi
with mappings for these new variables. In particular, we should map
these to the corresponding symbolic variable from each input store,
which is precisely given by the valuation transformers Ψ1 and Ψ2.
We express this mapping using the standard static single assignment
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(true) for all σ ,pi〈[],pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(emp) for all pi〈[pi(â) · f 7 pi(v̂)],pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(â · f 7 v̂) for all pi
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(ρ̂1 N ρ̂2) iff σ = σ1 unionmultiσ2 such that 〈σ1,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(ρ̂1)
and 〈σ2,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(ρ̂2) for some σ1,σ2
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(ρ̂ ∧pi) iff 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(ρ̂) and pi ∈ γ(pi)
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂)
CSTORE-SIMP
ρ̂ ∈ Sˆ 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γSˆ(ρ̂)
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂)
CSTORE-UNFOLD
ρ̂  unfold ρ̂ ′ 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′)
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂)
Figure 14. Concretization of abstract stores.
φ(·, ·) function. The key observation here is that the precision of the
programmatic valuation pˇi after a join point is determined by the
valuation transformers computed by the static analysis.
D. Shortify Soundness
In this section, we state in more detail the shortify soundness
theorem from Section 4.1 that relates the statically-proven store
with the assertion store to synthesize the short-circuiting validation
store.
Concretization. In Figure 14, we define the concretization of ab-
stract stores 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂). We distinguish simple stores that do not
have any inductive summaries and write Sˆ for such simple stores.
In the top portion of the figure, we give a standard concretization
function γSˆ : Sˆ→Mem×Valua that goes from simple store ab-
stractions to concrete memory-valuation pairs following separation
logic [24].
We then assume a syntactic unfolding relation that materializes
fields from summary constraints, such as κ . For an inductive
validation checker κ like bst, the unfolding relation κ  unfold ρ̂ unfolds
the inductive definition while replacing formal parameters with
actual arguments (cf., Figure 5a). We write κ1 N= κ2 for a segment
generalization of inductive predicate κ1 to a hole at κ2 whose
syntactic unfolding can be similarly defined [7]. The specific forms
of inductive summaries are not crucial and can vary, provided that
they come equipped with a syntactic unfolding relation. We can
then lift this syntactic unfolding relation to stores ρ̂  unfold ρ̂ ′ by non-
deterministically selecting a summary to unfold while framing the
rest of the store.
Finally with syntactic unfolding, we define the concretization
of a separating shape abstraction as either the concretization of
a fully-unfolded, simple store abstraction (CSTORE-SIMP) or in
terms of the concretization of an unfolding (CSTORE-UNFOLD). The
concretization of abstract stores 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂) is the least relation
satisfying the given inference rules.
Short-Circuiting Template. We give a more direct version of the
short-circuiting checker template Figure 7b by unfolding the pre-
condition and inlining the static shape analysis. Recall that the proof
strategy for statically analyzing the template outlined at the end of
Section 4 was by an unfolding of the pre-condition.
Definition 2 (Short-Circuiting Invariant Checker Synthesis). For an
inductive validation checker k, a short-circuiting variant is defined
as follows:
â · ksc(v̂′, v̂) def= emp ∧ v̂′ = v̂
∨ ∨
i
(
ρ̂ ′′i ∧ v̂′ 6= v̂
)
where ρ̂ i ` [ ρ̂ ′′i ] E â · k(v̂′)
for all i s.t. â · k(v̂)  unfold ρ̂ i
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The first disjunct corresponds to the short-circuiting condition,
while the latter disjuncts correspond to each disjunct in the definition
of the original inductive validation checker k. We restrict the form
of inductive checkers â ·k(v̂) to be disjoint disjunctions (i.e., if-then-
else) of pure facts and separating conjunctions points-to â · f 7 v̂ and
inductive summaries κ . As a consequence, we assume that inductive
checkers are precise, that is, for any concrete memory σ , there is
only one sub-memory that is in the concretization of â · k(v̂) (for a
given valuation pi). And so each disjunct of the original inductive
validation checker k corresponds to a case of the short-circuiting
template ksc.
We now consider shortify soundness (Theorem 1) from Sec-
tion 4.1. To prove this proposition, we first generalize the induction
hypothesis to allow for a frame ρ̂0 in the statically-proven invariant
(that is not needed to decide how to synthesize the short-circuiting
validation).
Theorem 2 (Shortify Soundness). If 〈σ0unionmultiσ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂0 N ρ̂) with
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂) and ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′ and 〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′) where
σ ′′ ⊆ σ , then 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′) for some σ ′ ⊆ σ .
Proof. By induction on the derivationP of 〈σ0unionmultiσ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂0 N ρ̂)
and the derivation S of ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′ using the lexicographic
order ofP followed byS .
AssumingP , we consider the cases of the shortify derivation
S . The particularly interesting case is for when S follows from
SHORTIFY-INDUCTIVE.
Case. S = ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′ ] E ρ̂ ′ SHORTIFY-VALIDATE
Immediate.
Case. S =
ρ̂ v ρ̂ ′ N true
ρ̂ ` [true ] E ρ̂ ′ SHORTIFY-PROVEN
Given ρ̂ v ρ̂ ′ N true, we have that γ(ρ̂)⊆ γ(ρ̂ ′ N true), so 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′ N
true). By the concretization of N, we have that σ = σ ′ unionmultiσ1 for some σ ′,σ1
such that 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′) and 〈σ1,pi〉 ∈ γ(true).
Case. S =
pi ∧pi ′′ v pi ′
emp∧pi ` [emp∧pi ′′ ] E emp∧pi ′ SHORTIFY-EMP
Given pi∧pi ′′ v pi ′, we have that γ(pi)∩γ(pi ′′)⊆γ(pi ′). From the hypotheses,
we see that pi ∈ γ(pi)∩γ(pi ′′), so pi ∈ γ(pi ′) and thus 〈[],pi〉 ∈ γ(emp∧pi ′).
Trivially []⊆ [].
Case. S =
U
ρ̂ ′  unfold ρ̂ ′′′
S1
ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′′′
ρ̂ ` [ ρ̂ ′′ ] E ρ̂ ′ SHORTIFY-UNFOLD
By the i.h. onP and S1, we have that 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′′) for some σ ′ ⊆ σ .
Thus, we can construct the derivation
U
ρ̂ ′  unfold ρ̂ ′′′ 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′′)
〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′) CSTORE-UNFOLD
Case. S =
S1
ρ̂1 ` [ ρ̂ ′′1 ] E ρ̂ ′1
S2
ρ̂2 ` [ ρ̂ ′′2 ] E ρ̂ ′2
ρ̂1 N ρ̂2 ` [ ρ̂ ′′1 uprise ρ̂ ′′2 ] E ρ̂ ′1 N ρ̂ ′2
SHORTIFY-SEP
Given 〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′1 uprise ρ̂ ′′2), we have that σ ′′ = σ ′′1 ∪σ ′′2 for some σ ′′1 ,σ ′′2
(that need not be disjoint) such that 〈σ ′′1 ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′1) and 〈σ ′′2 ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′2).
Given 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂1 N ρ̂2), we have that σ = σ1 unionmulti σ2 for some σ1,σ2
such that 〈σ1,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂1) and 〈σ1,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂1). By the i.h. on P and S1
with 〈σ ′′1 ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′′1), we have that 〈σ ′1,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′1) for some σ ′1 ⊆ σ1.
Analogously by the i.h. on P and S2, we have that 〈σ ′2,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′2) for
some σ ′2 ⊆ σ2. Since σ1 and σ2 have disjoint domains, σ ′1 and σ ′2 must have
disjoint domains. Thus 〈σ ′1 unionmultiσ ′2,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ ′1 N ρ̂ ′2) and σ ′1 unionmultiσ ′2 ⊆ σ .
Case. S =
â · k(v̂) ` [ â · ksc(v̂′, v̂) ] E â · k(v̂′)
SHORTIFY-INDUCTIVE
Because we construct ksc so that â · ksc(v̂′, v̂) is precise, we have that
A =
â · ksc(v̂′, v̂)  unfold v̂′ = v̂
A1
〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(v̂′ = v̂)
〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(â · ksc(v̂′, v̂))
or
A =
â · ksc(v̂′, v̂)  unfold ρ̂ ′′u ∧ v̂′ 6= v̂
A ′1
〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂ N ρ̂ ′′u ∧ v̂′ 6= v̂)
〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(â · ksc(v̂′, v̂))
for some ρ̂ ′′u .
In the first subcase, from 〈σ ′′,pi〉 ∈ γ(v̂′ = v̂) and the hypothesis
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(â · k(v̂)), we have that 〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(â · k(v̂′)).
In the second subcase, we now consider the concretization of â · k(v̂).
The CSTORE-SIMP cannot apply because â · k(v̂) is an inductive summary.
Thus, it must be case that
P =
â · k(v̂)  unfold ρ̂u
P1
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(ρ̂u)
〈σ ,pi〉 ∈ γ(â · k(v̂)) CSTORE-UNFOLD
such thatS ′ :: ρ̂u ` [ ρ̂ ′′u ] E â · k(v̂′). By the i.h. onP1 withS ′ and emp
for ρ̂0, we have that 〈σ ′,pi〉 ∈ γ(â · k(v̂′)) for some σ ′ ⊆ σ .
E. Hash Trie Benchmark
In this section, we describe some additional details about the hash
trie benchmark. The hash trie data structure maps keys to values. To
store this mapping, a key is hashed, and the bit blocks of the result
are used to traverse down the trie to the storing node. Hash collisions
are resolved by rehashing at certain levels to provide infinite bit
blocks. We consider this data structure as a significant challenge
for static verification, as it involves arbitrary hash functions, non-
trivial rehashing, and bit-wise concatenation of the rehashed keys.
DIVVA demonstrates the synergy with dynamic validation for these
constraints.
The inductive predicate hashtrie shown in Figure 15a constrains
p̂ath with an uninterpreted function hashblocks that corresponds to
a complex pure constraint. These uninterpreted functions enables the
elimination of some infeasible states in the analysis, but constraints
involving them are left to dynamic validation. In Figure 15b, we
give the corresponding C-style invariant checker that validates the
path from the root to every stored key equivalent to the bit blocks
of the hashed key. The blocks are computed by hashblocks which
potentially rehashes the key up to the current level. This function
includes bit operations, a loop, and invocations to a hash function.
We fixed the example to blocks of two bits and rehashing at every
12 levels.
The write operation of the hash trie is shown in Figure 15c. The
main loop traverses down the trie to locate the storing node for the
key. In an iteration, bit operations extract two bits to determine
the direction, and rehashing is invoked at every 12 levels. Note
that the rehashing function hash is different from hashblocks in
invariant validation. For a static verifier to prove the assertion at
the end of hashtrie_write, it must be able to reason about how
the code in this function maintains the hashblocks property. For
DIVVA, it does not need to be able to relate hash and hashblocks
to synthesize short-circuiting dynamic validation. The only static
reasoning that it needs to show that the trie invariant is maintained
across traversal iterations, which is done so by the validated view
abstract domain.
After the traversal locates a node to update or reaches an empty
sub-trie, the write operation modifies the trie and asserts the invari-
ant before returning. This modification essentially stores the key in
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
 

t̂ ·hashtrie(l̂evel, p̂ath) def⇔ emp ∧ t̂ = null
∨ ∃k̂, d̂, l̂v, b̂lk00, b̂lk01, b̂lk10, b̂lk11, p̂00, p̂01, p̂10, p̂11.
t̂ ·k 7 k̂ N t̂ ·v 7 v̂ N
t̂ ·blk00 7 b̂lk00 N t̂ ·blk01 7 b̂lk01 N
t̂ ·blk10 7 b̂lk10 N t̂ ·blk11 7 b̂lk11 N
b̂lk00 ·hashtrie(l̂v, p̂00) N b̂lk01 ·hashtrie(l̂v, p̂01) N
b̂lk10 ·hashtrie(l̂v, p̂10) N b̂lk11 ·hashtrie(l̂v, p̂11)
∧ t̂ 6= null ∧ l̂v = l̂evel+1 ∧ p̂00 = lshift(p̂ath,2)
∧ hashblocks(k̂, l̂evel) = p̂ath
∧ p̂01 = p̂00+1 ∧ p̂10 = p̂00+2 ∧ p̂11 = p̂00+3
(a) An inductive definition for hash tries.

 

val hashblocks(val key, val level) {
val blocks = 0, hkpart = 0, hk = hash(key, 0);
for (val l = 0; l < level; l++, hkpart += 2) {
if (hkpart >= 2*12) hk = hash(key, l), hkpart = 0;
blocks = (blocks << 2) | ((hk >> hkpart) & 0x3);
}
return blocks;
}
bool hashtrie(ht t, val level, val path) {
val k, dv lv;
return t == NULL ? true :
(k = t->k, v = t->v, lv = level + 1, p00 = path << 2,
hashblocks(k, level) == path &&
hashtrie(t->blk00, lv, p00) &&
hashtrie(t->blk01, lv, p00 + 0x1) &&
hashtrie(t->blk10, lv, p00 + 0x2) &&
hashtrie(t->blk11, lv, p00 + 0x3));
}
(b) Corresponding C-style invariant checker.

 

HT *hashtrie_write(HT t, val key, val val)
{
assume(t ·hashtrie(0,0));
if (t == NULL) MKLEAF(t, key, val);
else {
HT p; val l, hk = hash(k, 0), hkpart = 0;
for (p = t, l = 0; ; l++, hkpart+=2) {
if (key == p->k) { UPDATE(p, key, val); break; }
if (hkpart >= 2*12) hk = hash(k, l), hkpart = 0;
block = (hk >> hkpart) & 0x3;
if (block == 0x0) {
if (p->blk00 == NULL) { MKLEAF(p->blk00, key, val); break; }
else p = p->blk00;
}
else if (block == 0x1) {...}
else if (block == 0x2) {...}
else {...}
}
}
assert(t ·hashtrie(0,0)); return t;
}
(c) The hash trie write.
Figure 15. The write operation for hash tries.
the trie. While DIVVA cannot verify the constraints over it, the syn-
thesized incremental validation code simply invokes hashblocks
on the modified node while short-circuiting the validation of the rest
of the hash trie.
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